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ABSTRACT

A CRITIQUE OF THE ADVISORY OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE ON THE LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, 8 JULY 1996. THE "NUCLEAR WEAPONS CASE".

The General Assembly of the United Nations, by Resolution, requested the
International Court of Justice to give its Advisory Opinion on the following legal

question:
Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under
intemational/aw?
The question raises a number of legal, political and moral issues which go to the
heart of the development of public international Iuw, and of relations between States in
the United Nations era.

Central to all such issues is the tension, both legal and political, which exists
between the five declared nuclear weapon States (the Pemmnent Members of the United
Nations Security Council) and most non-nuclear weapon States. Essentially, the latter
take the view that the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be illegal in all
circumstances, largely in terms of the humanitarian laws of armed conflict. The former
insist that, in the absence of specific prohibitior::, nuclear weapons are not illegal in all
foreseeable circumstances.
This dichotomy has been institutionalised in the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation

Treaty, which solidified the discriminatory treatment accorded to nuclear weapons by the
nuclear weapon States during the Cold War practice of deterrence.
The nub of the Court's findings was that it was unable to conclude definitively
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in extreme
circumstances of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.

I

VI

This thesis examines, in five Chapters, the legal and political background to the
Case, the text of the Opinion, and the evidence and argument led by States. It evaluates
the Opinion in terms of the Dissenting and other Opinions of individual judges of the
Court, its dicta, and the coherence of its argument. Finally, it draws conclusions
concerning the outcomes, relevance and impact of the. Opinion for the judicial
independence and integrity of the Court; nuclear deterrence, non-proliferation and
disarmament; principles of self-defence in international law; and a rights-based approach
to international relations and law.
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FOREWORD.

The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the
threat or use of nuclear weapons, 1 given in response to United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 49/75 K and handed down on 8 July 1996, was the culmination of several years
of activity at both State and Non-Governmental Organisaton (NGO) levels around the world.

From an unpromising beginning in the form of private representations to the
Governments of New Zealand and Australia in 1987, NOD activity aimed at obtaining a
General Assembly "Request for Opinion" Resolution intensified rapidly, especially in the
work of three large international bodies: the International Physicians for the Prcver1tion of
Nuclear War ( IPPN), the IntcrnaLional Peace Bureau (IPB) and the International Association
of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms ( !ALANA).

These organisations initiated a global alliance of over 700 NGOs, known as the
"World Court Project", which played a leading role in the sponsorship and adoption of the
United Nations General Assembly Resolution referred to above. The Draft Resolution,
sponsored by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement of States, was passed by a
vote of 78 in favour, 43 against, with 38 abstentions on 15 December I 994. 2
A total of 43 States made written statem;::nts and oral submissions in the course of
Pleadings before the Court, far greater than any previous case.

' 35 I.L.M. 809 (1996).
Draft Resolution NC. 1/49L.36.International Court of Justice., The Hague, Netherlands. 23 December !994
[Communique No. 94/24].
A similar question was put to the Court by Resolution of the Forty-sixth World Health Assembly of the World
Health Organisation, a specialised Agency of the United Nations:
In view oft he heahh and environmental effects, would the usc of nuclear weapons by a State
in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including
the WHO Constitution? (Resolution 46/40, of 14 May 1993).
The Court declined to consider the request of the WHO, having regard for its jurisdiction in terms of Article 65
of its Statute, a component of the Charter of the TJnitcd Nations.
2

2

This thesis comprises a critique of the Court's Advisory Opinion in tenns of the
evidence of fact, and the law before it. By reviewing the strength of both (their relevance,
inte :pretation and application to the question posed) it will assess the arguments led on both
sides, and draw

the-:;~:-

together in order to evaluate the Court's ratio decidendi.

Further, it will examine a range of possible effects and implications of the Opinion
for the development of international law, while attempting, with respect, to indicate the
circumstances from which it may he possible to impute a level of extra-juridicaJ influence
upon the Court which tends to call into question its standing as an international tribunal, and
as an independent institution within the United Nations system.
With this in mind, it must be stated at the outset that this thesis takes the general
position that the Court erred in its dispasitif, at least to the extent of its finding of non·liquet
on elements of fact, and of law available to it?
There can be little doubt that this Opinion, by far the largest matter ever brought
before the International Court of Justice, is also one of its most important. As a signal
example of the values assigned by the international community to the Court's jurisprudence,
the Opinion highlights the dual realities of its judicial and political roles.
The wide divergence of views surrounding the interpretation of international law,
evident in the Pleadings by States before Jt, is reflected in the individual Opinions of Judges
on the Court's Bench. The Advisory Opinion stands as a sobering affirmation of the need to
continue efforts to develop a positive Law of Nations which is capable of support from the
entire international community.

l

See Chapter II, Section2.1, for the text of the Court's dispositif.
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CHAPTER I.

LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES.

I. INTRODUCTION.

In order to develop a coherent and comprehensive critique of the Advisory Opinion,
and one which takes account of both its legal and political contexts, it is necessary to draw
together the threads of the evolution of public international law within the United Nations
system since its inception in 1945, and to place Ihe International Court of Justice within that
frame. 1 In doing so, it is essential to review the development of the international geopolitical system of States since that time, in the context of alternative theoretical analyses of
the international system of relations between them.
An understanding of the juxtaposition and interdependence of these two fields of
international affairs is vital to an integrated judgment of the tasks which the international
community expects its "World Court" to perform, and of the Court's success in discharging
its duties.

2. STATEMENT OF AIMS.
The thesis has the following aims:

1.

To examine critically the Advisory Opinion of the Court in respect of its

jurisprudential coherence, having regard for:

1

The time-frame referred to here includes the transitional period which the international system has now
entered following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold Wc.r, both of which began
during 1989. Wiener has asserted that the continued international leadership of the United States is central to
the question of the effectiveness of the United Nations in the "new world disorder" of diffuse axes of power and
lack of direction. He also quotes former U.S. President !lush, stating before ConpTess on ll September !990
that "we are 1ww in .¥ight of a United Nations which performs as envi.rioned by its founders", and in January
1991 that: "we are the m1ly nation on thi.r earth that could assemble the forces of peace. This is the burden of
leader.~hip". Wiener, J. (1995). Leadership, the United Nations, and the New World Order. In D. Bourantonis
& 1. Wiener (Eds.), The United Nations in the New World Order (pp. 41-63). Hound mills: Macmillan.

4

(a). The argument and evidence led and adduced before it by States;
(b). Its identification and interpretation of relevant law and evidence of fact from the
corpus both of law and of evidence available to it.

2. To undertake a comprehensive review of all sources of international law in order
to identify those relevant to the question posed by the General Assembly Resolution.

3. To ascertain the extent of available evidence of fact relevant to the question.

4. To interpret and apply relevant applicable law, and evidence of fact, in order to
draw conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of the Court's Opinion.

5. To examine, analyse and interpret the

geo~political

context in which the Advisory

Opinion has been given, and the range of possible effects and implications of the Opinion in
terms of the future course of international law, geo-political relationships, and nuclear
disarmament.

6. To reach general and specific conclusions summarising the legal and political
positions on both sides of the question, and defend the final position of the thesis.

3. THE GENESIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.

Modem public international law may be said to have had its genesis in the
constitution of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco in 1945. 2 From that point on,
international law has been progressively codified through an increasingly complex matrix of
conventional instruments, such as Covenants, Conventions, bilateral and multi-lateral

2

The San Francisco Conference adopted the Charter, together with the Statute of the lntemational Court of
Justice, on 26 June 1945. Both came into force on 24 October 1945, and the first Session of the Court took
place in The Hague from 6 April to 6 May 1946. Eyfffinger, A. (1995) The lmemational Court of Justice. The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, at pp. 98, 99.

5

Treaties, and other agreements and Declarations, which modify, extend and are declaratory
of the customary international law, and "general principles of law" 3 which have mediated

relations between Western nations since ancient times. 4
It is necessary here to emphasise that this fonn of public international law,
understood traditionally as the product of the European mind, and having its modern origins
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century work of scholars such as Vitoria, Gentili, Grotius

and Hobbes/; represents only one part of a rich, world-wide landscape of legal traditions
founded on religious, social, ethical and cultural structures. 6 Its arena was the European
system of nation-States which had been developing in the century before the 1648 Pact of

Westphalia, 7 and it served from that time as a unifying force within Europe, in the absence of
centralised political authority. 8
Such a secularised, "Enlightened" legal system9 contrasted sharply with others
throughout the world. In Asia, the Vedic law traditions of Hinduism had greatly influenced
the "inter-state" law of South and Southeast Asia from around 1500 BC, 10 as had the
Buddhist world view, beginn:ng a full millenium later. 11 The international law of the Muslim
world presented a further distinction from Euro-centric legal traditions, founded as it was on
the religious teachings of the Prophet Mohammed in the Seventh century, and embodied in
Article 38 (I) of the Stalutc of the Intcrnalional Court of Justice defines such principles, at sub-paragraph c.,
as "the general principles of law recognised hy civilised nations''. Harris, D. J. ( 1991 ). Cases and materials on
international law (3rd rev. ed.). London: Sweet & Maxwell, at p.998. Refer to Appendix 2.
4
Eyffinger, Chief Librarian in the Court's Registry (1996), provides an overview of the development of
international law from its European genesis in the century leading up to the Peace of We.rtphalia of 1648,
during which the modern Stale syslem became established, to the present day. Loc. cit. at Note 2 above, pp. 414.
5
Ibid. The humanist Jegfll scholflr Hugo Grotius, who has long been considered one of the founders of
international law, solidified the form of a Euro-centric public international law in his seminal work De jure belli
ac pacis ("The laws of war and peace") of 1625. His works were based on the notion that the core of
civilisation was founded on the cumulation, repelition and synthesis of the works of prominent minds from all
ages, which constituted its intellectual legacy and the essence of human conscience. At p.14.
6
Ibid, Ch. 8. A detailed, but somewhat arbitrary categorisation of world legal systems includes their European,
Asian, Islamic, Latin American and African components.
1
Ibid, p. 184. The Pact of Watphalia established the sovereign independence, territorial integrity and equality
of States, while establishing instruments of diplomacy for the resolution of disputes within the doctrine of
bellum iustum, or "just war".
8
Ibid, p. 10.
9
Ibid p.9. The Reformation ethos which rejecled the moral theology and religious bonds of the Church formed
the foundation of the secular, positivist formulation of international law, as propounded by Grotius.
10
Ibid, p.203.
11
/bid, p.208. Unlike the secular international law of the European tradition, the international law traditions of
many Asian regions arc rooted finnly in religious faith and social organisation.

.l
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the Qur'an. 12 Further distinctive international legal systems are represented by the vast

complexity of pre-colonial social structures in Latin America and Africa, and their effects on
the ways in which the post-colonia1 States of these regions have been incorporated into the

modern (post-1945) international legal and political regimes.n
It is clear, then, that international law, as it developed under the aegis of the United
Nation~

system after the Second World War, could not rely for its philosophical and

intellectual foundations solely on the European legal tradition if it was to reflect the
religious, social or cultural needs of States widely differentiated in these spheres. 14
For this reason, the International Court of Justice, "an intrinsic part of the UN
Organisation [and} ... the cornerstone of a multi-faceted structure of dispute settlement"

15

is

constituted to take account of, and represent, the principle legal systems of the world.
Since 1987, the distribution of appointments to the fifteen seats on the Bench of the
Court has been as follows: the "Western" group of States (Western Europe, the United
Kingdom, the "Old Commonwealth"

16

and the United States): 5 seats; the {exJ Socialist

States of the fanner Soviet bloc: 2 scats; the Afro-Asian group: 6 seats (African and Asian
States each with 3 seats), with one seat each to Latin America and the Caribbean region. 17
Any such distribution can probably never avoid controversy based on perceptions of
relative political influence between States, but it appears, at least superficially, that the
12

/bid, p.221. The predominant position of religious law over secular law in the Islamic world is pervasive. Its
innuence has been perceived as growing with the rise, in recent years, of Islamic Fundamentalism, and the
establishment of theocratic States ( in, for example, Irnn since 1979).
13
Ibid, p.252. Eyffingcr indicates the influence which African members of the Court have had in pressing for a
new and contemporary international law, on~ which rejects the stasis of the past for recognition of the principle
of progressive development of the Jaw.
14
The United Nations system nevertheless acknowledges the organisational legacy of the League of Nations
and the "Versailles System" (notwithstanding its ultimate failure), as docs the I.C.J. to its predecessor, the
Pennanent Court of International Justice. In particular, the Statute of the Pennancnt Court served as the basis
for its successor, allowing a large degree of continuity of judicial practice between the two institutions, even
though the present Court, unlike its predecessor, is an integral organ of the international body. Gill, T. (1989).
Litigation strategy at the International Court: A case study of the Nicaragrw v. United States dispute.
Dordrccht Martinus Nijhoff, at pp. 5-9; Singh, N. (1989). The role and record of the Imernational Court of
Justice. Dordrecht: Marti nus Nijhoff. p.B.
15
Loc. cit. at Note 2 above, p.2.
16
The term "Old Commonwealth" is used here to describe those countries which attained responsible
parliamentary government and Dominion status within the British Empire during the Nineteenth Century. They
include Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
17
Article 9 of the Statute of the Court provides, inter alia, that the body of members of the Court should
represent "the main forms of civilisation and of the principle legal systems of the world". Op. cit. at Note 5,
p.991. Sec Appendix 2.
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majority of the world's legal, political, economic, social, cultural, ethical and religious
systems have gained a measure of representation on the Court's Bench.

4. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW SINCE 1945.
The history of the development of international law since 1945 can be viewed as an
analogue of the fundamental changes, discussed below, which have evolved over the past

fifty years in the geo·political relationships between States. If it can be said to have a
coherent goal towards which its evolution might be directed, then that articulated by All ott in
1990 may serve the purpose:
The new international law will be as dynamic and as rich as the law of any
subordinate society, organizing human willing and acting in every field which
concerns the survival and prospering of the society of which it is the law. 18
In contrast with this universalist vision, other writers, such as Green and De
Visscher, 19 are pessimistic about the ability of the universal rule of international law to serve
the disparate attitudes and interests of geo-political State groupings. As political realists they
cannot comprehend a legal regime able to transcend the power of individual States.
Nevertheless, this is precisely what the Charter of the United Nations seeks to do. As
the legal and political keystone of the modern era, its dual function gives it the inherent
strength with which to resist any opposition by States, or other international actors, to the
overarching system it supports.
In this role it may be said to gain strength from the overtly positivist tenor of its
text.:w The clear pronouncement of rights and duties of States, unencumbered by allusion to
meta-theoretical discourses (such as those concerned with natural rights or virtue) 21 places

18

Cited in Dixon, M. & McCorquodale, R. (1991) Cases and materials on international law. London:
Blackstone, at p. I I.
19
Op. cit. at Note 5, p.S.
20
The Positivist legal tradition can be traced to John Austin, whose seminal I 832 work "TI1e Province of
Jurisprudence Determined" sought to establish law as a set of rules. Sartorius, R. (1971). Hart's concept of law.
In RobertS. Summers (Ed.). More essays in legal philosophy (pp. 13 1-161). Oxford: Blackwell.
21
Two leading works on justice from natural rights, and from virtue arc, respectively: Nozick, R. (1974).
Anarchy, state and utopia. Oxford: Blackwell; and Mac Intyre, A. (1981). After virtue: a study of moral theory.
London: Duckworth.
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the Charter within a long tradition of legal positivist philosophy, and allows its universal
acceptance as the benchmark against which to measure the behaviour of all actors with

'
' I personaI'tty.
mtematiOna

22

The International Court of Justice holds a position of great importance within the
United Nations system, since its primary function is to analyse and apply the law as it exists

(lex lata) in order to render clear judgments, and opinions, in accordance with its obligations
under its Statute (which is itself a part of the UN Charler)? 3
Its function as the pre-eminent legal arbiter of disputes between States, and of all
aspects of public international law, gives the Court the character of a mediator, or pivot,
through which turns the dialectic which modifies and develops international law. As it
arbitrates disputes between States through the discovery, interpretation and application of the
law, and renders opinions on questions raised by States, the Court reveals, by its published
deliberations, the degree of its significance for (and influence upon) the rule of law among
them.
This is not to deny that the Court suffers from procedural difficulties in the course of
its jurisprudence. Examples may be taken from customary and conventional sources, or a
combination of both. The so-called "Optional Clause" (Article 36 (2) of the Court's Statute)
allows States to declare that they recognise as compulsory ipso facto the jurisdiction of the
Court, while sub-paragraph 3 of the same Article allows States to place reciprocal and
temporal caveats on those declarations.

24

In the history of cases before the Court, the 1984

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v United

22

The San Francisco Conference was able to begin with a tabula rasa, on which it could inscribe a Constitution
for "We the peoples of the United Nations ... " (in the Preamble of the Charier) which was open for membership
" ... to all other peace-loving states ... " (Article 4 of the Charter). The term "international personality" refers not
only to independent sovereign States within the international community, but also to international organisations,
such as those created by international conventions, and to the United Nations Organismion itself. Certification
of the existence of such derivative subjects of law is given at: Advisory Opinion on Reparalions for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. 1949 J.C.J.Repor/s 174 at 174, 178-9 and 185. Cited in von
Glahn, G. (1992). Law among natiom: an introduction /o public illlernational/a\1' (5th rev. cd.).New York:
Macmillan, at p.l33. See Appendix I.
23
The competence of the Court is laid down in Chapter 2 of its Statute, in Anicles 34 to 38, and covers such
matters as: who may selse the Court, the extent of its jurisdiction, continuity with the Pennanent Court's
competence, and the sources of international law applicable to its jurisprudence. Loc. cit. at Note 5.
24
Ibid.
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States of AmericaP5 provides a clear example of the problems which this Article can

produce. 26
Secondly, the codification of the customary law of treaties m the 1969 Vienna
Convention

011

the Law of Treaties

27

has introduced a new dimension of certainty (but

analytical complexity) to the adjudication of disputes turning on the interpretation of rights

and duties arising from treaty obligations. 28
A third example of potential for jurisprudential impairment, and one central to this
thesis, is the practice of Dissenting and Separate Opinions, and individual Declarations, in
the published decisions of the Court, as provided in Article 57 of the Court's Statute.

Each has served to circumscribe the jurisprudence of the Court, although Hussain
points to individual opinions as nothing more than lhe external manifestation of the Court's
"dialectical process" of judgment in a collegiate setting (surely an overly optimistic view).
He also sees no possibility of damage to its "moral authority". 29
The International Court of Justice occupies a central position in the international
system, from both a legal and a political perspective. Its ability to maintain that position will
depend on its capacity accurately to modulate the relative weight it should accord in its
judgments to each of these domains of international affairs.

2

~ 1984/.C.J. Reports 392. Sec Ch. II, Note 22.

26

In this case, the United States made a Declaration modifying its "Optional Clause" Declaration after realising
that its dispute with Nicaragua would come before the Court, thus seeking to deny the Court's jurisdiction to
hear the matter. In the event, it did not succeed because of self-declared time constraints, but the potential for
manipulation by States of the Court'sjurisdiction is undeniable. Op. cit. at Note 20, p.529.
27
1155 U.N. T.S. 331.
28
61 A.J.I.L. 263-463 (1967). As a law-making Treaty, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was
based on draft Articles produced by the International Law Commission, and represents an example of a
synthesis of codification and the progressive development of customary international law. Op. cit, at Note 5,

f·729.
9

Hussain summarises arguments for and against the practice of allowing Dissenting Opinions in a collegiate
curial setting. Its opponents are said, unsurprisingly, to decry the perception of its enfeebled solidarity, a "rule
of minorities" within the Bench, and susceptibility of individual Judges to political pressures. Its supporters are
cast as champions of judicial pluralism, as envisaged in Article 9 of the Statute of the Court (See Note 8,
supra). They also assert that Dissenting Opinions ensure greater judicial responsibility, and arc useful obiter
dicta for understanding majority decisions. Hussain, I. {1984). Dissenting and separate opinions at the World
Court. Dordrccht: Marti nus Nijhoff, at pp. 2-4, and 73, While not denying the force of these arguments, it
seems equally open to hold that one compelling reason for the usc of Article 57 is, as J. S. Mill pointed out in
his 19th Century Utilitarian tracts, that minority-based opposition is better viewed in the cold light of day, and
required to justify itself, rather than be suppressed.
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5. INTERNATIONAL GEO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1945.

It is in the nature of the human race, as within the natural world, that the rules are
made by the victors of struggle, and not by the losers; that new turns in the international legal
road are dete1mined by those with political strength. Such was the case during April -June

1945 at San Francisco as the fonn and constitution of the United Nations Organisation was
negotiated,30 by which time it had become clear to the Western Allies, and to the Soviet
Union, that the Axis Powers would be defeated. 31 The United Nations Charter was
negotiated, by the fifty nations then comprising the bulk of the international community, on
the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals of 1944 for the establishment of "an international
organisation for the maintenance of peace and security." 32
The impulse for the Western Allies to seek a new international regime was the failure
of its predecessor. The twenty year period between the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and the
beginning of the Second World War was one of insularity, instability, and ultimately of
breakdown in relations between nation-States. 33 The Treaty itself, in its attempt utterly to
subdue the German nation and its former allies through military and economic sanctions, 34
contained the seeds of a second, even more devastating world conflict. The idealism inherent
in U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Point Plan" for world peace and stability
provided a further avenue for complacency, drift and appeasement of aggression in the
context of isolationism, and deep economic and geo-political dislocation among the Western
liberal democracies. 35

Refer to Note 2, supra.
While the war in Europe was entering its ftnal stages, Japan showed no sign of an intention to surrender its
Home Islands. The anticipated f:matical defence of their homeland by the J<~panese people, and the potential
loss of up to 500,000 US troops has been proposed as the primary reason for President Truman's decision to
usc nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Yergin, D. H. (1990). Shattered peace: the origins of
the Cold War. New York: Penguin, at p.ll5.
32
Op. cit. at Note 2, supra, p.96.
n Glynn describes the liabilities of liberalism for liberal democracies, and the need for a balance between
liberalism and foreign policy realism. He describes " ... the arduous path by which liberal societies gradually
attained a level of realism in foreign affairs, often only to lose sight of it and then be forced by events to recover
it again". Glynn, P. (1992). Closing Pandora's box: arms races, art11s contra/, and the history of the Cold War.
New York: BasicBooks. At p. xi.
34
Ibid, pp. 51~55.
Jj Ibid, pp. 47-50. The Treaty of Versailles was more armistice (seen by Germany as fundamentnlly unjust) than
peace treaty. Wilsonian Idealism, and the institution of the League of Nations, were no match for such deeply-

)O

31

II

The victors of San Francisco (all except one of which was, at that time, ignorant of
the existence of practical and deliverable nuclear weapons) were detennined that the
outcome of the second conflagration would be a mechanism which could, through the
codification of international law and the use of institutions for the settlement of disputes,
ensure that no nation would be able to escape the sanction of the international community.
The Clausewitzian use of force in international relations, except in the case of self-defence
(and then only according to strictly delineated rules) was to be consigned to history. 36

Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of international relations in the period from 1945
to the present has been the transfonnation of a Euro-ccntric international system into one of
global reach and significance. 37
A second fundamental and defining event was the development, prosecution and
cessation of the "Cold War" between the American and Soviet spheres of influence, and the
economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union which gathered pace during 1989. The
bipolar struggle for ascendency between irreconcilable ideological antagonists began in
earnest in 1949, with the explosion of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union. The subsequent
forty-year balance of terror, epitomised by the United States' strategy of "Mutually Assured
Destruction", needs no embellishment. 38
A third event crucial to an understanding of post-war international relations and the
development of international law, and one which is related to the first, is the dismantling of
the Asian and African empires of European States, a process which began after 1919, and
accelerated after 1945. By that time, the metropolitan States of Britain, France, Belgium and
the Netherlands had lost credibility as colonial hegemons, in consequence of their fortunes in
war against the Axis Powers.

held convictions, nor for the effects of the world-wide economic Depression of the 1930s, and political
instability in Europe.
36
Ibid, p.l76. The Clauscwitzian Doctrine of War asserts the subordination of means to ends, and war as an
extension of national policy. It also asserts that victory in warfare comes as the result of the maximum possible
application of force, in space and time; in other words, through total war.
37
This is not to contend that the international system (of law, commerce, inter-State relations and so on) did not
exist on the same geographical scale prior to 1945.11 docs suggest, however, that the plurality, density, diversity
and instability of the system became fundamentally different and exponentially greater in degree.
38
Op. cit. at Note 33, pp. 395-421. Sec also, Op. cit. at Note 35, pp. 124-137.

12

The aspirations of the many newly-created sovereign States, and of their constituent
tribal, ethnic, cultural, economic and religious groupings, many of which spanned artificially
mandated international borders, is one further key to understanding the dynamics of
international relations and law ufter 1945. 39

These aspects of inter-State relationships form the basis for relating evidence of
historical political events to the range of theoretical perspectives and ideologically-dependent
frameworks which have been proposed as ways of constructing and comprehending the
realities of international relations.

In this way, theoretical accounts of the practise of inter-State relations (which itself
generates and develops international law) will condition analysis of actual events within
those relations. In the context of this thesis, the issue becomes tile ways in which analyses of
the origin, conduct and cessation of the Cold War (and the role of nuclear weapons) are
coloured by international theory. Such an awareness is necessary to support a broad
understanding of the legal and political background of the Court's Advisory Opinion.

6. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY.

Contemporary international relations theory represents a contested, idiosyncratic, and
didactic domain of political thought in which practitioners assert a wide range of more, or
less, mutually exclusive world views, causal relationships and catcgorics. 40 Perhaps the only
proposition each would agree on is the fundamental importance of applying some definition
of power in modulating their understanding of relations between States."11
9

One regional example of this process is provided by McCloud's study of the colonisation of Southeast Asia,
bringing as it did the break-up of traditional politics, their social organisations and economic frameworks. The
new post-colonial States of the region had to build national unity and independence despite, rather than because
of, their international boundaries. McCloud, D.O. ( 1986). System and pmcess in Southea.rt Asia: the ei'Olllfion
of a region. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.
40
The vast literature in international relations theory renects the wide diversity of approaches to the study of
this discipline. An introduction to the main strands of thinking in modern structuralist (as opposed to postmodern) contemporary theory would include, but not be limited to, Wight (1966), Bull (1972 and 1976),
Keohane (Ed. 1986, and 1988), Lijphart (1974b), Skocpol (1979), Walz (i979) and Wallerstein ( 1991 ).
41
One widely accepted definition of power is the ability to influence an agent in such a way as to cause that
agent to do something he, she or it would not otherwise have done. Paolini's study of the work of Foucault on
alternative post-modem conceptions of power relations is one example of the persuasive usc of a postJ

IJ

To illustrate this point, one need look no further than the development of
international theory since the publication of Martin Wight's influential 1966 paper,

42

in

which he claimed the non-existence of international theory, given the domination of the State
in general political theory (which as a result was inappropriate to a sphere in which survival
was the paramount concern).

Such an extreme position does not advance tdiS discussion, which takes as
fundamental the necessity for international relations analysis to accept the agency of
individuals, groups of individuals, and institutions in international, as well as domestic
political affairs.
Nevertheless, analysis of the role of individual agency in theories of international
relations, as opposed to that of institutions and ideologies, is problematic in several widely
accepted theories which have been advanced during the last thirty years to explain and
structure inter-State and global relationships. 43

6.1. ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSES IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY.
The first a priori debate of recent note has been that between communitarian and
cosmopolitan paradigms in the development of theory. As Smith notes,'~ 4 a communitarian
perspective emphasises the assignment of rights and duties in international society to
political communities, as such. By contrast, cosmopolitan theories stress the need for moral
arguments in this sphere to be based on individuals, or on humanity as a collective whole.

45

structuralist epistemology to explicate a perplexing dynamic in international relations theory. The agenda of the
realists is now being undermined by new discourses such as this. Paolini, A.J. (1993). Foucault, realism and the
£ower discourses in international relations. Australian Journal of Political Science, 28 (I), 98- I 17.
2
Wight's paper was entitled "Why is there no international theory'?" ( 1966). In H. Butterfield and M. Wight
(Eds.), Diplomatic lm•estigations: essays in the theory ofinlemarional politics (pp. 17-34). London: Allen &
Unwin. It has been interpreted as a reminder of the fragility of international relations, and the ephemeral nature
of a regime of sustained co-operation between States. Cited in Hur~cll, A. (1995). International political theory
and the global environment. In K. Booth & S, Smith (Eds.), International relations theory today (pp. 129·153).
Cambridge: Polity Press. At p.l51.
43
Smith, S. (1995). The self. images of a discipline: a genealogy of international relations theory. In K. Booth &
S. Smith (Eds.), International relations theory today (pp. 1-37). Cambridge: Polity Press. This article develops
a compact narrative which traces the evolution of vectors of international theory from the 1950s to the present.
At Chapter I.
44
Ibid, p.9.
45
Ibid. There is no doubt that a perception of international relations which is built on recognition of the selfworth of the individual, and on individual moral transcendence, is one far removed from that of (neo)realists
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This dichotomy tends to pose more questions than it answers. Not the least of its
difficulties is the question of the practical relevance of moral argument to theories
incorporating a realist slant or component. It is possible, however, to argue that much
contemporary conventional intJrnationallaw, such as the 1966 International Convention on

the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 46 and the 1984 UN Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment41 do
indeed assign moral rights to individuals within the international sphere, and that this trend is
likely to increase as Kantian humanists gain ground. 48

An early schematic useful for comprehending international relations theory was that
expounded by Wight in the 1950s, which identified three traditions: realism, rationalism and
revolutionism, or alternatively that of Machiavellians, Grotians and Kantians49 • This
convenient trichotomy comprehends, respectively, international anarchy, mixed conflict and
co-operation, and transcendent humanity. Its most fundamental difficulty may be that such
categories are not obviously mutually compatible, and that they depend on discrete
epistemologies. From a practical perspective, it may not be defensible to privilege one
tradition while excluding its rivals completely. 50
A third categorisation has been that

o~ ·t.-;:

division of Twentieth century international

relations theory between the three "Waves" (The Wilsonian idealism of the imerhellwn, the
"realism" of the post-war world, and the social-scientific "behaviouralist" approach of the
1960s), together with the two "Great Debates" which separated them. 51

and practitioners of international diplomacy, 11Je caveat here should be that this debate is no more than a metanarrative, with little rcievancc to purely pragmatic discourses.
46
60 U.N.T.S. 195.
47
Misc. 12 {1985), Cmnd. 9593: 23 l.L.M. 1027 and 24/.L.M. 535.
48
Ibid.
49
In one sense, such a discrimination in rival theoretical perspectives amounts merely to a discussion about
ethics and the place of morality in international affairs, and especially warfare. It thus becomes a simplistic
debate between "moralist" and "realists", Ho!sti, K. J. {1972) lmernational politics: a framework for analysis.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, at Ch. 14.
50
/bid, Note 45. If each tradition has its own exclusive evaluative criteria, then a comparative discourse will not
be coherent, and they must exist together, but without being mutually exclusive.
51
This approach seems to exhibit the tendency, apparent in others, to build theories to fit perceived reality,
rather than to test evidence against hypotheses.
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Lijph<lfii has argued for the falsity of such a division on the grounds that a more
defensible discrimination is that between the traditional paradigms of idealism and realism,

on one hand, and the scientific paradigm of the behaviouralists, on the other. Here the issue
has become the dispute concerning the utility of a natural science approach to theories of
international relations, all of which must necessarily incorporate more qualitative rather than
quantitative analyses of data and other evider.ce.53

A further debate in international theory, and one its detractors would argue mimics
the difficulties of Wight's structure noted above, is the more recent "Inter-Paradigm" debate
of the mid-1980s onward. 54 Now, theorists such as Wallerstein 55 argue that there are still
three substantial accounts of international politics, but that they are located within the same
framework, and as such are reasonably coherent as between each other.

The basic categories of disputants have become (and allegedly largely remain): neorealism (also tenned "structural realism"), liberalismlglobalism/pluralism, and neoMarxism/structura/ism. As Smith indicates,

56

this schema is helpful in any attempt to

understand international relations since each paradigm can be summarised in terms of its
answers to questions about the main or predominant actors, issues, processes and outcomes
in the international political arena. In reality, it must be acknowledged that the
Marxist/structuralist component is becoming rapidly less relevant to analysts following the
end of the Cold War, and that the substantive debate is now that between the realists and the
liberals. In this way, current debates seem to turn, perhaps not surprisingly, on alternative

accounts of human nature.
Nevertheless, the now-familiar trichotomy tends to suggest over-simplification of
categories, and the suspicion, alluded to above, of "warehousing" or privileging of one
~ 2 Ibid, Note 45. Lijphart, A. (1974a). International relations theory: great debates and lesser debates.
International Socia/ Science Journal, 26 (1), 11-21; Lijphart, A. (1974b). The structure of the lheoretieal
revolution in international relations theory. lntemational StudieJ Quarterly, 18 (I), 41-74.
53

The behavioural, "natural science" phase of social science, prevalent during the 1950s and 1960s, parallels
the realist political ethos of the Cold War era to the extent of its assumption of the efficacy of determinist
solutions to problems. The logics of "Massive Retaliation" in US nuclear warfare strategy of that era, and
measurable behaviour vectors in contemporaneous psychology arc both underpinned by detenninism.
54
Ibid, Note 45.
55
Sec Wallerstein, I. (1991). Geopolitic!>' and geuculture: E.rsays on the changing world system. Cambridge,
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, especially Chapters 7-9 in regard to the Brandt Report on North/South
relations, and the middle-run prospects for capitalism in the world economy.
~ 6 Ibid, Note 45, at p.l8.
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category to the detriment of overall coherence. 57 In addition, the inherent inflexibility of
labels is a methodological criticism, especially for those theorists who work within a post-

modernist or post-positivist epistemology. 511
The realist/liberal dichotomy can, in fact, never be mutually impermeable, since each

paradigm contains elements of its rival. A more efficient perspective would be a relativist
one in which a comparison of tendencies and trends does the explanatory work. In this way,
the relative weight accorded by each world view to such concerns as the use of force in inter-

State relations, basic international co-operation, absolute as opposed to relative gains, and
the role of positive law becomes measures for assessing the strength of either a (neo) realist
slant or perspective, as opposed to a liberal one, in explanations of intemational relations.
As noted above, theoretical accounts of the ways in which States relate to each other
will condition analyses of actual events within those relations. To that extent, the account of
theory which predominates in this thesis is the neo-liberalist story, 59 summarised as complex
interaction between States, universal acceptance of norms of international behaviour, and the
prominent place of non-State actors in the international sphere. While this explanation of
reality is, like many, vulnerable to accusations of being reflexively constitutive of that
reality, rather than explaining it60 (a methodological conundrum) it nevertheless seems more
capable than others of approaching and explaining such contemporary phenomena as
pluralism, inter-connectivity, flexibility in rapid change, and h11manism in the inter-state
field.

It also appears to have the explanatory strength to explicate the origins, conduct and
ultimate cessation of the Cold War, and its relevance to the present Opinion, especially

57

Note 52, s11pra.
Note 43, supra. It is not proposed to canvass in detail the work of this school of theory in the field of
international relations, but merely to acknowledge the influence of writers such as Foucault, Derrida and
Habermas, especially in relation to their work on the nature of power and knowledge. These writers offer
alternative epister.10logies concerning, inter alia, discontinuities rather than historical progress, relative rather
than absolute outcomes, the contingent nature of facts and truth, and the social construction of reality. Loc. cit.,
Note 45, supra, at Ch. 10: Vasquez, J. A. The post-positivist debate: Reconstructing scientific enquiry and
international relations theory after Enlightenment's fall. Loc.cit., at Note 43, pp. 217-240.
59
Sec infra, Chapter II, at Note 12.
60
Tite question is whether the social world has an existence external to its observers, or whether it just is what
observers make it. This methodological and philosophical complexity is addressed by practitioners of the
critical school of social theory who assert that knowledge is not value-free.
SR
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wl1en, as discussed above, the

neo~realist

perspective

IS

enlisted to add a measure of

theoretical balance.

7. CONCLUSION.

As an institution whose primary task is the settlement of inter-State disputes, the
International Court of Justice must operate in the political, as well as the legal domain. As
such, its judgments must be considered in light of contemporary international political theory
and reality, and in particular of the imputable world views of its Bench.
Representing as it does the range of the world's societies, decisions of the Court will

reflect, and be seen as reflective (in whatever degree) of the political, as well as juridical
positions and influences of their ussentient and dissentient Judges. Explanations of the ways
in which States relate to each other will play a role in determining
decisions.

at~d

explaifliflg its
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CHAPTER II.

OVERVIEW OF THE OPINION.

I. INTRODUCTION.

On 8 July 1996 the International Court of Justice delivered its Advisory Opinion,

General List No. 95, "Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons", in response to
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/75 K, adopted on 15 December 1994.

1

The operative paragraph of that Resolution incorporated the following question: "Is

the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international
law ?2 Some measure of the importance with which the international community of nations
viewed this matter can be gained by the fact that no Jess than twenty-two States appeared
before the Court to present oral submissions/ while forty-three States submitted written
material.4
This Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice is of great significance
for the international community for fundamental and complex reasons. It is the first occasion
on which the pre-eminent judicial body concerned with the international legal regime has
addressed the cardinal question of the legal status of nuclear weapons in intemationallaw. 5
Engaging as il does one of the most controversial political issues touching modern
international law, the Opinion can be seen as a test of the Court's judicial independence
1

The full text of the Advisory Opinion is available [on-linc]at: http://web.inter.NL.net/hcc/A.Malten!Unan5A.html. lt incorporates UN General Assembly Resolution 49n5K, together with a detailed description of the
conduct of the case, and of States appearing before the Court. [35 l.L.M. 809 (1996)]. The only previous case
before a superior court which concerned the question of the legality of nuclear weapons was the !963 Shimoda
Case, brought before the District Court of Tokyo by five Japanese citizens against the Japanese Government.
The Court held that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not justifieri by military necessity, and that
the United States had thereby violated international law. 8 Japanese Ann. lnt'l. L. 212 (1964); 58 A.J.I.L. !016
(1964).
2

Ibid, pam I.
Ibid, Note 1., para. 9.
4
International Court of Justice (1996). Legalify of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Pleadings, Oral
Arguments, Documents. The Hague: Author.
'The Court has now delivered a total of 23 Advisory Opinions since its constitution in 1946. Lnc. cit., at Ch.l,
Note 2, p. 369.
3
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within the United Nations system, and the degree to which it may be susceptible to political
pressures from States in a rapidly evolving international environment. 6
In this context, a distinction may be drawn between those States which seek to
emphasise the value of the Court's deliberations to the international system, and the
development of international law, and those which would diminish its standing and influence
over issues which they regard as falling outiiide its purview (indeed, several States argued
before the Court that it was not competent to give an Advisory Opinion in the present case,
having regard to its duties under its Statute). 7
From this perspective, the Opinion can be seen as representative of a fundamental
antinomy lying at the heart of international relations. Should relations between States be
mediated through the acknowledgment of the rule of international law (as exemplified in the
principle of pacta sum servar1da, and the text of the Charter of the United Nations) in order
to impose coherence and comity? Conversely, should they be governed, at the most basic
level, by those long-established customary principles and rules, founded on State
sovereignty, neutrality and consent, which "shape and reinforce international anarchy"? 8
Put another way, is the nation-State still adequate to maintain order and avoid wars in

6

The issue of the character, location and intensity of political influence, whether fonnal or infonnal, on
individuals, organisations and States, as well as the International Court of Justice itself, forms an important
theme in this thesis. One component of that debate will involve the Statute of the Court, and the provenance of
its Judges. An introduction to this debate is provided by Gill, T. D. (1989). Litigation strategy at the
lntemational Court. Dordrccht: Martinus Nijhoff, especially Part One, Section I: "The Changing Political
Environment and its Impact on the Court.", at pp. 5- 36.
7
The Oral Submissions of States such as France and the Russian Federation, which challenged the competence
of the Court to deliver an Opinion, arc available (to the extent of their relevance here) at [on-line} :
http.://www..icjquote.html. That source also includes edited transcripts of Submissions representing a range of
positions taken by States oo the law, and evidence of fact, available to the Court.
8
Kegley, C. W. & Wittkopf, E. R. (1993)- World politics: trend and transformation (3rd rev. cd). Houndmills:
Macmillan, at p.501. These authors provide a discussion of the structural limits of the international legal
system, at p.501 et seq., which canvlsscs both iL<; institutional constraints (such as the lack of supra-national
rule enforcement) and its relevance based on the overwhelming preponderance of those States acknowledging
basic principles of international Jaw (such as treaties, conventions and formal declarations) which they
recognise and respect. See also Starke, J. G. (1986). The science of peace (rev. cd.). Sydney: Legal Books Pty.
Ltd, at Ch. 8: "The Legal Framework of Peace", and specifically pp. 130-133: "Weaknesses of imernational
law", in which he states (p.130), inter alia, that "The crucial weakness remains... that international law suffers
from the absence of external force or sanctions to ensure the observance of its rules under all circumstances."
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a world in which military imbalances are underpinned by the reality that every State is
"unconditionally vulnerable to virtually total destruction"?9
These questions are driven by the debate in the philosophy of international law
between those who regard municipal and international law as separate legal orders which
dispute for primacy, and those who see them as part of the same order, one or other being

supreme within that order. 10
This

so~called

monist/dualist debate forms the foundation upon which the arguments

led by States in the present Opinion were based, in respect both of the competence of the
Court to deliver an Opinion, and its substance, based on fact and law.
This thesis, as a critique of the present Opinion, will address, inter alia, the issues
noted above. In doing so it will necessarily be concerned with the legal character of the
Court's argument and conclusions. However, it must be emphasised that the Opinion has
been rendered in the context of both the global arena of geo-politics and international
relations, and a range of influences, both tacit and overt, upon the Court itself. No
worthwhile examination of the provenance, nature and possible effects of the Opinion can
ignore this duality.
Finally, the fundamental assumptions concerning the nature of international politics,
and of the international system, will be informed here by the structural theory, canvassed in
1

Chapter I, of "nee-liberal institutionalism" or "nco-liberalism". 1 The b1sic tenets of such an
underManding of international affairs can be summarised as:

9

Brown, S. (1991). The world polity and the nation-state system. In R. Little & M. Smith (Eds), Perspectives
world politics (rev.cd., pp. 263-271, at p.264). London: Routledge. Reprinted from International Journal,
vol. xxxix, no. 3 (Canadian Institute oflntcrnutional Affairs, (1984) ut pp. 509-528),
10
Harris, D. J. (1991). Cases and materials 011 illfernational/aw (3rd rev. cd.). London: Sweet & Maxwell, at
pp. 69-72. Fain, H (1987) Normative politics and the commw1ity of nations. Philadelphia: Temple University
Pre~s. elaborates the dichotomy between the Monist concept, epitomised by Hans Kelsen's grund norm that
"£he States ought to behave as they have ulways behaved", and the Dualist (or pluralist) view that the
jurisprudential relationship between the international legal system and the separate domestic legal systems is
problematic, Most Dualists contend that governments may legally prefer domestic law when it conflicts with
international law (pp. 39-41 ).
11
Lnc. cit., supra, Note 9, at Chapter 2. These authors discuss a range of "rival perspectives in changing
contexts'' in terms of alternative images, or "mental models" of objective realities. Conceding that the quest for
theory is "elusive", they offer the political Idealism of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, in contrast with the
Realist project of those who view the State-based, Hobbesian "balance-of power" the~is as objective reality. A
third, now Jnrgely discredited approach (as they point out) is the empirical, pseudo-scientific behavioural
approach of the 1960s and early 1970s. See purticularly pp. 20-28.
011
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(a.) Co-operation and complex interdependence between States in all spheres of
activity;

(b.) Universal adherence to principles and norms of international behaviour by
States;
(c.) The essential role of non-State actors in the international arena. 12

2. OVERVIEW OF THE OPINION.

A review of the dispositif of the Opinion will be followed by a summary of the
substantive arguments developed in its text. 13

2.1. THE COURT'S DISPOSITIF.

From its deliberations as to the facts and law applicable to the question before it, the
Court delivered its dispositifin the following terms:

A.
Unanimously,
There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific
authorisation of the threat or use of nuclear weapons~

B.
By eleven votes to three,
There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any
comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons as such;
12

Ibid. Such "non-State actors" include, for example, the Court itself, other specialist U.N. Organisations, and
many Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). For a discussion of the implications of "Globalism" for the
international system, sec: Holsti, 0. R. (1989) Models of international relations and foreign policy. Diplomatic
History, 13, 15-43.
13
Ibid, Note I.
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c.
Unanimously,
A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article
2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the
requirements of Article 51, is unlawful;

D.
Unanimously,
A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the
requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly
those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as
with specific obligations under treaties and undertakings which expressly deal
with nuclear weapons;

E.
By seven votes to seven, by the President's casting vote,

It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of

nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international Jaw
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law;

However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements
of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat
or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in extreme
circumstances of self~defence, in which the very survival of the state would be
at stake. 14
14

Ibid, Note 1., at para. 105. President Mohammed Bedjaoui of Algeria used his casting vote to allow the
adoption of the terms of para. 105 (2 E). Eyflinger, A. (1996). The International Court of Justice 1946- 1996.
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, provides a treatment of the history and constitution of th~ Bench of the

23

F.
Unanimously,
There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disannament in all its aspects under strict and

effective international control.

The Court had concluded, unanimously, that no State may point to customary

international law, nor to treaty law, as in any way authorising the use, or threat of use, of
nuclear weapons (Paragraph 105 2A). However, it found (by eleven votes to three) that no
such laws specifically prohibited the threat or use of nuclear weapons in a general and
comprehensive way (Paragraph 105 2B).

Secondly, it reaffirmed, unanimously, the principles of non-use of force, and selfdefence in relations between States, as incorporated in Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the United
Nations Charter, and their applicability to nu..;lear weapons (Paragraph 105 (2)C).
Thirdly, it identified, unanimously, the international law which o.pplies to the threat
or use of nuclear WNlpons, nominating the international humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflict, and the lex specialis oL tteaty obligations and other express undertakings in
respect of nuclear weapon.<;

g~ ir.~ernatioual

law most particularly applicable to the question

(Paragraph 105 2D).
Fourthly, it found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally 15 be
contrary to principles and rules of humanitarian law in anned conflict (emphasis added), but
that it was unable to conclude whether this was so in an extreme circumstance of self-

Court, including, inter alia, the distribution of scats, the nomination and cledion of Judges, and the Presidency
of the Court. Sec Appendix 2: Statute of the Court.
15
Many Dissenting Opinions of Judges emphasise the fact that the usc of the word "generally" is unsatisfactory,
since it is imprecise, ambiguous, and wholly unsuitable for use in connection with the application of
international law, and particularly the rules of humanitarian law, to the threat or usc of nuclear weapons. An
exemplar of this position is the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, [foe. cit. Note lJ in which he notes
in his "Preliminary Observations on the Opinion of the Court", para. (c)(ii), that the word "generally" grades in
meaning from "as a general rule, commonly", to "universally, with respect to all, or ncnrly all", with interim
alternatives, Available [on-line] at: http:www.dfat.gov.au!ild/icj/_nuc/w_man_a.html. Collins Reference
Thesaurus (1992) includes the word "universally" as an acceptable alternative. London: William Cullins.
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defence "in which the very survival of the State would be at stake" (Paragraph 105 (2)E).

16

(It is notable that these findings turned on the casting vote of the President of the Court,

since voting on this section of the dispositifwas split equally)P
Finally (at Paragraph 105 (2) F) the Court identified the international community's

obligation to pursue in good faith negotiations which would lead to meaningful end
pennanent nuclear disarmament "in all its aspects".

2.2 THE TEXT OF THE OPINION.

2.2.1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.
The Court found that it was competent under the li.:!nns of Article 96 of the Charter of
the United Nations

18

to give an Advisory Opinion on a legal question to the General

Assembly, and that there were no "compelling reasons" for it to refuse to give such an
Opinion.

19

Before seeking to define the extent of relevant international law nonns available to it,
the Court had first to address the argument that the word "permitted" in the "Request for
Opinion" implies a negative understanding of the basis of international law. Thus, and
contrary to the principles of sovereignty and consent, the threat or use of nuclear weapons
were said to be subject only to prohibition in either conventional or customary law.
argued by some States that the dicta in the "Lotus"
16

21

20

It was

Case of the Pennanent Court, and those

The second limb of Para. 105 (2)E consists of a reply to a question which was not put to the Court by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, namely the "extreme circumstances of self-defence" in which the
survival of a State would be at risk, This in itself serves to bring the entire Opinion, prima fade, into question.
17
Op. cit., supra, Note 6.
18
Ibid, Note 10, at p.987.
19
/bid, Note I, paras. 10-19. The Court aflinned that the question posed was of a ''legal" nature,
notwithstanding its political clements, and that it should exercise its discretionary power under Article 65 of i!S
Statute (Op. cit., supra, Not~ 10, at p.IOOI) to give an opinion. The question did not lack relevance or
precision, and an Advisory Opinion would not move the Court beyond its judicial role, and into the realm of
law-making. See Appendix 2, the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
20
The representative of France, in Oral Submissions before the Court, was forceful in articulating this
argument. International Court of Justice, Oral submissions, written s!atements and re.'iponses. Unpublished
material.
21
P.C.I.J Reports, Series A, No. !0. The Wrus Case (France v. Turkey (1927)) turned on France's contention
that Turkey had acted in conflict with principles of international law by prosecuting a French national for
im '•mtary manslaughter of eight passengers and crew of the Turkish vessel Boz-Kourt in international waters

25
in the "Nicaragua" 22 Case of the present Court supported their contention that States are able

legally to threaten or use nuclear weapons unless specifically and expressly prohibited from
doing so by treaty or custom.

The Court's apparently peremptory dismissal of these arguments rested on the fact
that the nuclear-weapon States acknowledged the restrictions imposed on their actions by the

general principles and rules of humanitarian law. Hence, there was no question of a predetermined burden of proof imposed on those States seeking to promote the cause of
illegality of nuclear weapons. 23

2.2.2. RELEVANT LAW.
The Court then considered relevant applicable law, noting Article 6 of the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 24 and Article II of the 1948 Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime o[Genocide. 25
The Court examined a range of nonns relating to the safeguarding and protection of
the natural environment, together with provisions of various treaties and other instruments
which have lhat airn? 6 While their applicability in times of war was acknowledged to be
following its coHision with the French steamer Lorm·. The Judgment of the Court rejected France's contention
that Turkey should be able to point to "some title to jurisdiction recognized by international law in favour of
[it]". It stated that international law governs relations between "independent Stales", and that restrictions upon
that independence "cannot be presumed" (para 3).
22
I.C.J. Reporrs 1986, p.4. The Nicaragua Case (Merits) (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicmagua v. United States of America) ) concerned military and other measures taken by the
United States against the Sandanista Government of Nicaragua, including direct attack on Nicaraguan strategic
assets, and assistance to the Contra rebels seeking its overthrow. Nicaragua alleged that the United States had
infringed customary and conventional international law, and Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, in
terms of its use of force. In its Judgment, the Court stated (para, 269) "in international law there arc no rules,
other than such rules as may be accepted lly the State concernrd. by {{taty or otherwise, whereby the level of
armaments of a sovereign State can be limited".
23
Ibid, Note 1., paras. 20-22. The Court's conclusion here is based on induction from the particularity of
humanitarian law to the general corpus of international law.
24
Ibid, Note 10, at p. 612. [999, U.N.T.S. 171; 61 A.J.I.L. 870 (1967)]. Para. I. of Article 6 states: "Every
human being has the right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
(his) life." Bailey states that, if the I.C.C.P.R. is declaratory of existing law, rather than creative of new
international law, then all States will be bound by the principle, whether or not they have ratified the Covenant.
Bailey, P. (1990). Human rights: Australia in an intemationa/ colllext. Sydney: Butterworth's, pp. 248, at 249.
25
78 U.N.T.S. 277; 45 A.J.l.L., Supp., 6 (1951). Article II lists acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national , ethnic, racial or religious group, as such".
26
Ibid, Note I,, paras 27-34. They included, among other instruments, treaties such as the 1977 Additional
Protocol/ to the Geneva Convemions of 12 August 1949 (1125 U.N.T.S. 609), which proscribes weapons
having widespread and severe environ ,nental effects, and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration of 1992.

26
contentious, the Court recognised the real environmental threat, in both space and time, of
the existence of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it stated its view, at Paragraph 30, that the
obligations of States to protect the natural environment during military conflict were not
absolute, although regard for environmental considerations mm;t form part of the assessment
of the necessity and proportionality of actions in self-defence. 27

The substantive finding in respect of environmental international law was that it does
not specifically p;ohibit the use of nuclear weapons.

At this stage, the Court was able to conclude that the laws most relevant to the
question posed were those relating to the use of force within the tenns of !he Charter of the
United Nations, the law applicable in armed conflict which regulates the conduct of
hostilities, and any specific treaties on nuclear weapons that the Court might determine to be
relevant. 28

2.2.3. APPLICATIONOFLAW.
The remaining part of the text of the Opinion is devoted to the application of the
identified relevant law, and to the conclusions which the Court drew from its own
jurisprudence and the submissions of States in framjng its dispositif. In a systematic review,
it began by emphasising the primacy of U.N. Charter provisions concerning the use of force
and self-defence, their applicability to nuclear weapons, and the fundamental difficulties in
the legal use of nuclear weapons, given the unique characteristics of these devices. It found
that the threat of use explicit in the notion of deterrence must conform with Charter
provisions, and that any legal use of force in self-defence, while proportionate to the force
used by an aggressor, must also conform with humanitarian law. 29

27

Ibid, Note 10, at pp. 848, 849. The customary principles of necessity and proportionality in self-defence arc
taken from the dicta in the Caroline case: [29 H.F.S.P. 1137-1138; 30 B.F.S.P. 195-196[.
28
Ibiti, Note 1., para. 34.
29
/bid, Note 1., paras. 37-50. The Court's acknowlerlgment of the political reality of "deterrence" in
international relations is apparent in para. 45, in which it takes note of the tenns of Security Council Resolution
984 (1995). That Resolution concerns security assurances made by each of the declared nuclear weapon States
(United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China) in the context of the extension of the Treaty on the
Non-proltferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995 [!973 Aust. T.S. No.3].
Most Dissenting Op:nions state without equivocation that the latter proposition is fundamentally and absolutely
impossible of perfonnancc.

27

It moved on to consider the law applicable to armed conflict, in tenns both of specific

rules, and of general principles and rules of humanitarian law. Finding that illegality,
according lo State practice, must be based on prohibition, and not on the absence of
authorisation, the Court examined the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement vf

Disputes of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in respect of "poison or poisoned
weapons",30 and conventional prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction.
110

31

It found

express prohibition in any case. It reviewed treaty law relevant to nuclear weapons (their

acquisition, manufacture, possession, deployment and testing),

32

and here approached the

essence of contention surrounding the issue of the legality of nuclear weapons. The
fundamental tension between the competing claims of humanitarian law and the doctrine of
deterrence is nowhere more evident than here?3
That tension was reflected, in the Court's view, in the competing claims made by
States in respect of the effect of the various nuclear weapon treaties on international law. It
referred to those States which contended that such treaties "bear witness, in their own way,
to the emergence of a rule of complete prohibition of all uses of nuclear weapons."

34

By

contrast, it noted the argument of States which hold the view that treaties which
acknowledge the existence of the principle of deterrence (such as the 1968 Treaty on the

Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its indefinite extension in 1995), together with
their acceptance as a fait accompli by non-nuclear weapon States, "confirm[sJ and
rcinforce[sJ the evident logic upon which those instruments are based." Any imputed
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would "be contrary to the very text of those
instruments."
10
·

35

Ibid, Note I., at para 54. They comprised the S:;cond Hague Declaration uf 29 July 1899 [U.K. T.S. 9 (1901),
Cd. 798], the Regulations annexed to the Hague Con\'ention /Vof 18 October 1907 [36 Stat.2277; TS 539; I
Bevans 631], and the Geneva Gas Prorocol of 17 June 1925 [TIAS No. 8061,94 LNTS65].
31
The latter comprised the 1972 Convellfion 011 the Prohibition of the De1•elopmelll, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction [26 USTS 583;
T.l.ll.S. 8062; 1015 U.N.T.S. 163] and the !993 Convemion on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapon.\· and 011 their Destruction [Mise 21 (1993), Cm. 2331;
32 I.LM. 800].
12
· Ibid, Note 1., pams 58, 59 .
.13 Ibid, Note I., paras. 51- 63.
34
Ibid, Note 1., para. 60.
·1 ~ Ibid, Note 1., pam61. Sec also supra, Note 8. The Oral Submission of Malaysia, forthrightly characterising
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as "at best an Atlantic concept of the Cold War", went on to assert that the
invocation of the right to self-defence perverts that right in the context of deterrence, which denies "the

28

The Court concluded that treaties dealing with nuclear weapons, as a corpus of
conventional law, did not constitute a prohibition by themselves, but that they could be seen

as foreshadowing a future general prohibition. 36
It then turned to customary international law to detennine whether a prohibition of
the threat or use of nuclear weapons flowed from that sourc.;! of Iaw.

37

The practices of States

were examined insofar as they could demonstrate the existence of a customary rule of
prohibition. The Court noted that no nuclear weapon State had used nuclear weapons in war
since 1945, but that those States had, through their doctrine of deterrence, reserved the right
to use them. It also noted the manifold General Assembly resolutions, beginning with

Resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, which have consistently affinned the illegality
of nuclear weapons:" 8 However, it concluded that neither practice constituted a customary
rule specifically proscribing nuclear weapons. In respect of General Assembly resolutions, it
noted that many had received substantial negative votes, and that the emergence, as lex lata,
of a customary rule of prohibition by this route was hampered by the tension, referred to
above, between this nascent opinio juris, and the continuing adherence to the doctrine of
deterrence.·19
Having found no fully-formed opinio juris on the question before it, the Court moved
on to canvass the vast body of humanitarian law; the codified provisions of Hague and
Geneva law which encapsulate the extent of customary humanitarian law, and are brought

together in the two I 977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It found that
international law, predating as it does the advent of nuclear weapons, applies to them as to
any other weapon. It reinforced its findings by referring to the celebrated "Martens Clause",

fundamental principles of humanity." In such a case, international law could not be utilised to support State
~ractices which deviate from those principles and "mainstream aspirations." Loc. cit., at Note 20.
6
1bid, Note 1., paras. 62, 63. Sec also supra, Note 15, in respect of the Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Weeramantry, at Part VII (I): "The Non-Proliferation Treaty."
37
Ibid, Note 1., paras 64- 73.
38
Judge Oda, in Part II of his Dissenting Opinion, provides a detailed chronology of the history of General
Assembly Resolutions since the 1961 Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear a11d ThermoNuclear Weapons[ A/RES/1653 {XVI)], available [on-line] at http;//www.dfat.gov.autild/icj_nuc/oda_a.html.
3
~1bid, Note 1., para. 73. Elias {1995) The nature of the subjective clement in customary international law,/nt.
& Camp. L Q., 44, 501-520, discusses the nature of the opinio juris, its function iu the development of
customary intcrroationallaw, and its differentiation from consent and will in relations between States.
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which affords general humanitarian protection in the absence of specific agreements, based
on established custom, the principles of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience.40

In its survey of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict the Court emphasised
that the fundamental rules of this domain of law must be observed by all States, since they
"constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law." 41 The extensive
codification of humanitarian law merely gave expression to pre~existing customary law, such

as that constituted by the "Martens Clause" discussed above.
The Court turned finally to consider the principle of neutrality, finding that it applies
to all international armed conflicts, "whatever type of we;ipDns might be used". 42

2.2.4. LEGALITY IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.
The remainder of the Opinion concerns itself with argument on the legality of the
threat or use of nuclear weapom: in certain circumstances. In contrast to the view of many
States that the nature of nuclear weapons (their massive, uncontrollable and indiscriminate
effects) determines their absolute illegality in terms of humanitarian law and the principles of
neutrality, 43 some held that this was not the case.
The United Kingdom asserted that, given their use was lawful in terms of selfdefence and the principles of necessity and proportionality, their legality in tenns of
humanitarian law must be determined on the particular circumstances of each use. 44
40 Ibid, Note 1., paras 74-87. As the CotJrt states, the "Martens Clause" was first included in the I 899 Hague
Con vel/lion with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, (supra, Note 30), and is now incorporated,
i111er alia, within Article I, para. 2 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions [1125
U.N.T.S. 609].
41
Ibid, Note I., para, 79. Set> also Note 30. The Court reinforced its argument by noting, at para. 80, that the
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal had found in 1945 that the Regulations annexed to the Hague
Conventirm IV of 1907 "were recognised by all civilised nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the
customs and laws of war." (International Military Tribunal, Trial of tile Major War Criminals, 14 November
1945 · I October 1946, Nuremberg, 1947, vol. I, p.245; 41 A.J.l.L. 224 (1947) ).
42
Ibid, Note 1., paras 88, 89, cited at para. 89. The Court quoted, with approval, the position of an (unnamed)
State that "The principle of neutrality ... was aimed at preventing the incursion of belligerent forces into neutral
territory, or attacks on the persons or ships of neutrals."
41
Ibid, Note l., paras. 92 · 93.
44
Ibid, Note \., para. 91. See also Notes 27 and 35, supra. Counsel for the United Kingdom, in his Oral
Statement before the Court on IS November 1995, made the assertion that "It is an inescapable feature of the
rule [against disproportionate civilian casualties} itself that the greater the military advantage that can
reasonably be expected to result from the use of a weapon in a particular case, the greater the risk of collateral
civilian casualties which may have to be regarded as within the law."

30

The Court noted that it had no precise evidence of the nature of such a circumstance,
nor on the risk of escalation of a limited use of nuclear weapons towards an "all-out use of

, h y1e
' ld nuc Iear weapons. "45
h1g
It further stated that it did not have "sufficient elements" to allow it to determine with
certainty the illegality of nuclear weapons in tenns of the principles and rules of law in
anned conflict in any circumstances (emphasis added).

45

2.2.5. THE PRINCIPLE OF "STATE SURVIVAL".
At this point, the Court referred "to the fundamental right of every state to survival"

47

and to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It pointed to

the established "policy of deterrence", and to security declarations made by nuclear weapondeclared States (in connection with the 1995 Indefinite Extension of the Treaty on the

Non~

proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) not to resort to them. 4M

3. CONCLUSION.
The Court was thus constrained "in view of the present state of international law
viewed as a whole ... and of the elements of fact at its disposal" 49 to state that it could not
reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of nuclear weapons by a State in
an extreme circumstance vf self~defence, in which its very survival would be at stake. 5°

4

~ Ibid, Note I., para. 94.

46

Ibid, Note I., para. 95.
Ibid, Note I., para. 96, the first indication by the Court of its promulgation of this novel dictum.
48
Ibid, Note 38. Judge Oda, at paras. 37~39 of his Dissenting Opinion, argues that the indefinite extension of
47

the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, in which one hundred and seventy~five member
States participated, has finnly established "the NPT regime" in the international community. He states that
favourable note was taken of the decision of the Conference by General Assembly Resolution SOnDQ, on 12
December 1995, by a recorded vote of !61 in favour with none against, India and Israel abstaining.
49
Ibid, Note 1., para. 97.
50
This conclusion constitutes the substantive finding in the Court's di.rpositif, at Paragraph I 05 (2E). Sec supra,
at Note 14.
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This conclusion was echoed in the second limb of the substantive Paragraph of the
Court's dispositif, Paragraph 105 (2) E, in which, as noted above, it also found that the threat
or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, and particularly the principles and rules of humanitarian law.

There is no doubt that the Opinion represents a comprehensive survey of international

law relevant to the question, in the context of the use of force by States.
It concluded with a call for all States to negotiate, in good faith, a nuclear
disarmament convention in terms of their obligations under Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on
the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
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51

Ibid, Note 1., paras. 98 -104; Also Note 29, supra. Paragraph 105 (2) F of the dispositif echoed this appeal.
[79 U.N.T.S. 161].
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CHAPTER III.

EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT LED BY STATES.

1. INTRODUCTION.

Having examined the text of the Opinion, and the legal and political frameworks
within which it was given, it is necessary now to approach the substantive component of the

thesis.

Broadly speaking, this will take the form of a critique of the Opinion in tenns of its
interpretation and application of relevant applicable law and fact before it, and of the Court's
jurisprudence.

That will require an examination of evidence from a representative sample of the
Pleadings of States, 1 in the form both of Written Statements and Oral Submissions made
before the Court at its public hearings. 2 This will reveal the positions of States as to:

(a.) The Court's jurisdiction in the case, together with its discretion not to hear the
matter, given that jurisdiction.
(b.) The most defensible interpretation and application of relevant law and facts to
the question, as well as the degree of divergence of opinion among States.
This amJysis, together with a selective review, in Chapter IV, of the Dissenting,
Separate and Individual Opinions, and Declarations of individual Judges on the Court's
Bench (all Judges having appended their own Opinion or Declaration) will assemble the
range of views on both sides of the question.
With these in mind, it will then be possible to examine critically the strength of the
Court's Opinion, having regard for:

1

The Statute of the International Court of Justice fonns part of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 66,
Paragraph 2, authorises the Court to seek information on a question which is the subject of a request for an
Advisory Opinion, in both written and oral fonns. The response of States to the Court's request will be termed
"Pleadings". Refer to Appendices I and 2,
2
Ibid.
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(a.) Its comprehensiveness.
(b.) The intemrllogic and coherence of its argument.

(c.) The continuity and extension of its jurisprudence.

While the question at issue - "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any
circumstance pennitted under international law?" - is of universal concern, it is relevant, in

a narrower sense, to two groups of States: those that possess nuclear weapons, and those that

do not.
To this extent, the position of the declared "nuclear weapon States" (The United
States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France and China) will play a pivotal role in any

critique of the Opinion. The Pleadings of the United States, the United Kingdom and, to a
lesser extent, France will be synthesised in determining the position of States which contend
the legality of a use, or a threat to use, nuclear weapons in war. 3
Of the many States which asserted the opposite conclusion, those which made the
most useful contributions to the Court's evidence included, but were not limited to,
Australia, Malaysia, Nauru and the Solomon Islands. The Pleadings of these States, together
with others, will be used to exemplify the views of the non·nuclear weapon States.

2. ARGUMENT LED BY STATES FOR THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.
The United States, in its Written Statement to the Court, and in its Oral Subrnission,4
expounded its view that the Court should decline to issue an Opinion, but that, if it chose to
do so, it should find that no prohibition exists in international law against either the use of
nuclear weapons, or a threat to use such weapons. The United Kingdom and France, in their

The Pleadings of the Russian Federation are less comprehensive (and carefully argued) than those of the other
three nuclear weapon States r~presentcd before the Court, although their thrust and conclusions arc substantially
similar. (China, for no reason discernible in the public domain, took no part in the proceedings). Pleadings of
States· Written Statements received by the Court from I February • 20 June 1995, pursuant to Article 66,
Paragraph 2 of the Statute of the Intenzational Court of Justice, at The Hague. Loc. cit. Ch. II, at Note 20.
4
Ibid.
J
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Pleadings,5 largely echoed or expanded on the fonns of argument and reasoning deployed by
the United States.

2.1 THE COURT'S DISCRETION NOT TO ISSUE AN OPINION.
The nuclear weapon States acknowledged the right of the General Assembly of the
United Nations to request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. 6
However, they argued that the Court has discretion, pursuant to its Statute,7 not to issue such

an opinion.
Both the United States and the United Kingdom expressed their view that the Court
8

had characterised the relevant operative Article of its Statute as permissive, while the United

States pointed to the Court's jurisprudence in support of its argument that there were
"compelling reasons" for the Court to decline to issue an Opinion? The United Kingdom
raised the further issue of judicial propriety, citing judgments of the Court which may be
"devoid of object or purpose",

10

11

may be "remote from reality'', or be incapable of effective

application. In its view, such judgments must "jeopardise its judicial propriety". 12

5

Ibid.
Charter of the United Nations, Article 96, para. I. Refer to Appendix I.
7
Statule of the 1/lfernational Court of Justice, Article 65. Articles 65-68 arc concerned with the Court's
jurisdiction in the issuing of Advisory Opinions. The Court's Statute forms part of the Charter of the United
Nations. At Appendix 2.
R Ibid, Note 7. Article 65, para. I, provides that "The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question
at the request of whatever body may be authorised by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
to make such a request." (emphasis added).
9
In the Judgmems oftlze A.dministrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation Upon Complaints
Made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J.Reports 1956, p.86, the Court concluded that "Notwithstanding the pennissive character of Article
65 ... only compelling reasons could cause the Court to adopt...a negative attitude .... " Cited in the Written
Statement of the United States of America, 20 June 1995, at pp. 3, 4, The Hague. UJc Cit., Ch. II, Note 20.
10
Western Sahara Case, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, at p.37. Written Statement of the United
Kingdom, 16 June 1995, at p. 10. The Hague. Ibid.
11
Northern Cameroons Case, I.C.J.Reports 1963, p. 30, at p.33.
12
1bid., Note 10. At p. 21 the Court stated: "In exercising this discretion, the International Court of Justice, like
the Pcnnanent Court oflntcrnational Justice, has always been guided by the principle that, as a judicial body, it
is bound to remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character even in giving advisory opinions. If the
question is a legal one which the Court is undoubtedly competent to answer, it may none the less decline to do
so. As this Court has said in previous Opinions, the pennissive character of Article 65, paragraph I, gives it the
power to examine whether the circumstances of the case arc ef such a character as should lead it to decline to
answer the question".
6
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The nuclear weapon States expressed their opinion that these dicta were relevant to
the present request on the grounds that:

(a.) The question was vague and abstract, and that the Court could never have
sufficient material to enable it to detennine all the numerous combinations
of circumstances in which a threat or use of nuclear weapons might arise.

(b.) It addressed complex issues which are the subject of consideration among
interested States, and within other bodies of the United Nations which have an

express mandate to address these matters.

(c.) An Opinion by the Court would provide no practical assistance to the General
Assembly in carrying out its functions under its Charter.

(d.) An Opinion by the Court would have the potential to undermine progress
alr.:.<'-dy in train on this sensitive subject (most particularly in respect of
disannament negotiations) and, therefore, is contrary to the interest of the
United Nations Organisation. 13
In general tenns, these submissions reflect a "black-letter" perspective of
international law which, perversely, denies its application to the special case of nuclear
weapons (seen as qualitatively different from all other types). It is submitted that this is not,
obviously, the case.

13

Loc. cit., Note 9, at pp. 1-7; Lo!'. cit., Note 10, at pp. I; 9-20. Also cf the Wrillen Statement of France, 20
June 1995, pp. 4-20, which canvasses substantially similar grounds (given in French; no translation is available
from the Court). Loc. cit., Ch. II, at Nole 20. These Pleadings may be considered in conjunction with the
statement of Mr. Harold Heilsnis, Director for Public Communications, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense, United States of America, that:
The elimination of nuclear weapons remains a long-term goal for the United States, but
implementing such a goal in the short-term implies an extremely optimistic scenario of
world events.
Heilsnis, F (1994). Director for Public Communications, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense,\ 'ihington, D.C. Unpublished manuscript, in the possession of the author.

----- - - - · · - - - - - - - - - - - - - · ·
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2.2 THE SUBSTANCE OF THE QUESTION POSED.

In general terms, the United States founded its position (that nuclear weapons are not
prohibited per se, nor in terms of their use) on four propositions:

(a.) That there is no general prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.
(b.) That the law of armed conflict does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.

(c.) That international environmental and human rights instruments do not
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.
(d.) That these conclusions ~rply equally to a threat to use such weapons. 14

The United Kingdom added a further step in the Pleadings of nuclear weapons States
by its contention that there are circumstances of self-defence, in the last resort, in which the
use of nuclear weapons must be regarded as legal. This is the first appearance of a principle
which became central to the Court's Judgment, and must be seen as an intrusion of the
discriminatory doctrine of deterrence into the customary and Charter law of self-defence.

15

2.2.1. GENERAL PROHIBITION.
The nuclear weapons States asserted that "it is a fundamental principle of
international law that restrictions on States cannot be presumed". 16 Further, a customary law
14

Loc. cit., at Note 9, pp. 7-47.
Loc. cit., at Note 10, pp. 36-39, especially at para. 3.37. At para 3.38 the United Kingdom stated, inter alia,
"Wh01tevcr the theoretical criticisms voiced of the idea of deterrence, the fact is, first, that it has worked and,
second, that for many years a number of States have based their self-defence upon it." Many non-nuclear States
would see this as affirmation of a willingness on the part of nuclear weapon States to sacrifice the rule of
international law for pragmatic self-interest.
16
Loc. cit., at Note 9, p.8. The United Kingdom cited the dicta in the Nicaragua Case, in which the Court
stated that : " .... in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State
concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited, and this
principle is valid for all States without exception." Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Merits), I.C.J.Reports, 1986, p.14, at paragraph 269. Loc. cit, at Note 10, p. 2l.See Chapter II,
Section 2.2.1. for an expanded examination of this argument. France contended that the question posr!d by the
General Assembly: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in all circumstance permitted under international
15

37

prohibition could not be created over the objection of the nuclear weapons States, and was
not created by abstaining from the use of nuclear weapons in war for humanitarian, political

or military reasons, ruther than a belief in a legal requirernent. 17
Moreover, they expressed their understanding that there is no international agreement
which contains a general prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. To the contrary, the very

existence of a range of agreements on aspects of nuclear weapons was evidence of the
absence of such a general prohibition. 18
Addressing these instruments categorically, the United States and the United

Kingdom pointed to:
(a.) Agreements on the use of other weapons, the pattern of which was said to imply a
lack of general prohibition in the absence of a similar agreement on nuclear weapons.

19

law?" (emphasis added) must receive a negative reply, since it is clearly to be understood as being inclusive of
their illegal use in aggressive war, as well as in self-defence. Loc. cit., at Note 13, p.21. This is a translation of
the question posed to the Court in French: "Est-il permis en droit international de recourir a fa menace ou a
l'empfoi d'armes nucfeaires en !ill!!£ circonstances?" The English version refers to "any circumstance",
allowing France its disingenuous reply that, of course, nuclear weapons may not be used in every conceivable
circumstance. The Court dealt peremptorily with this legnl tactic at Paragraph 20 of its Opinion by stating that,
notwithstanding the divergence in the two texts, the object of each was equally clear: to detennine the legality
of the threat or usc of nuclear weapons.
17
We. cit., at Note 9, pp. 8-9. The United States sought to extend the meaning of "State practice" as evidence
of a customary norm by adding a requirement that such practice must not only be "extensive and virtually
uniform", but also include States whose interests are ''specially affected". It cited the dicta in the North Sea
Colltinentaf Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. The
Netherlands), l.C.J. Reports, 1969, p.3, at p.43 in support of its position. A contrary view is supported by Judge
Tanaka in his Dissenting Opinion in the Smtth West Africa Cases, Second Phase, I.C.J. Reports, 1966, p.6, at p.
291, in which he stated that the objection of one, or a few, States against a practice cannot prevent it from
establishing a custom, since Article 38, paragraph I (b.) of the Court's Statute (establishing international
custom as an applicable source of law) docs not exclude the possibility of dissentient States. In Harris, D.J.
(1991). Cases and materials on international law (3rd rev, ed.). London: Sweet & Maxwell, at p.60.
18
We. cit., at Note 9, pp. 9-15. Alsc, We. cit., at Note 10, pp. 21-35.
19
Loc. cit., at Note 9, p.IO. TI1c United States argued that these instruments establish a regime of general
prohibition of certain classes of weapons. The absence of a similar Convention in respect of nuclear weapons
was held out as evidence that, in this ease, no such general prohibition exists. Those cited included:
St. Petersburg Declaration, 1868, prohibiting the usc of projectiles under 400 grammcs weight which are
explosive or charged with fulminating of innammablc substances. [!38 C.T.S. (1863~69); LXIV U.K.P.P.
(1869)659].
Hague Declaration No. 2, 1899, banning the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the distribution of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases. [187 C. T.S. (1898-99) 453; U.K.T.S. 32 (1907). Cd. 3751].
Hague Declaration No.3, /899, prohibiting the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the body. [187
C.T.S. (1898-99) 459; U.K. T.S. 32 ( 1907) Cd. 3751].
Hague Regulations on Land Wmfare annexed to Hague Convention No. IV, /907, Article 23 (a.) of which
prohibits the usc of poison and poisoned weapons. [205 C.T.S. (1907) 227; U.K.T.S. 32 (1910) Cd. 5030].

--
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(b.) Regional nuclear weapons treaties,

20

the existence of which were held to have the

same effect.
(c.) Agreements on the manufacture, testing or possession of nuclear weapons, the
most important of which is the 1968 Nuclear Nan-proliferation Treaty,

21

and which again

arc premised on a lack of general prohibition. 22
Insofar as customary law is concerned in the question of general prohibition, the
United States sought to emphasis that its own conduct, in bearing the burden of acquiring
and maintaining nuclear weapons, indicated its belief in their legality, as did "the variety and
disparity of views expressed by States" on the matterY In its view, these circumstances

precluded a customary general prohibition against nuclear weapons.

24

Geneva Gas Protocol, Jr• !5, prohibiting the usc of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, or analogous liquids,
materi<~ls or devices, <1nd bacteriological methods of warfare. [XCIV LN.T.S. (1929) 65~ U.K.T.S. 24 (1930).
Cmd.3604].

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Productiml and stockpiling of Bacteriological( Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and 011 their Destruction, 1972, prohibiting possession of bacteriological and toxin
weapons, and reinforcing the prohibition on their usc. [1015 U.N.T.S. 164].
Cite mica! Weapons Convention, 1993, prohibiting all usc of chemical weapons, and requiring the destruction of
existing stocks. [32/.L.M. 800 (1993)].
United Nations Convention 011 the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, 1977, prohibiting: the usc of weapons intended to change the environment through the
deliberate m<~nipulation of natural processes. [ 1108 U.N. T.S. 151]./bid.
20
Loc. cit., at Note 9, pp. !0, II. Regional nucl~ar weapon treaties include the Amarclic Treaty, !959 [402
U.N.T.S. 71]; the Treaty of Tlatelolco, l 967 [634 U.N. T.S. 281] and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty, 1985 [24/.L.M. 1440 (1986)].
21
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, I July !968, [79 U.N.1:S. !61].
22
Other treaties of this nature include:
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 1963. [480

U.N.T.S. 43];
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Badies, 1967. [ 610 U.N.T.S. 205];
Treaty 011 the Prohibition of rhe Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction 011
the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 1971. [ 955 U.N. T.S. 115];
Treaty on/he Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 1972 [ 944 U.N.T.S, 13];
Treaty 011 the Limitation of UndergrowuJ Nuclear Weapon Tt rts, 1974. [ 13 J.L.M. 906 ( 1974 )];
Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate Range and Slwrr.:r-Range Missiles, 1987. [27 l.L.M. 84 ( 1988)];
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Arms, 1993. [ 16 UN Disarmament Yearbook ( 1991 ), App.
II, p.450].
21
· Loc. cit., at Note 9, pp. 14-15.
24
Ibid. Also, Loc. cit., at Note 10, pp.27-32. Both the United States and the United Kingdom indicated that
their position was reinforced by their respective Security Declarations made at the conclusion of the 1995 New
York Conference on the Indefinite Extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. These Declarations,
given by all five declared nuclear weapon States, are both positive and negative. These States will, according to
their Declarations:
(a.) " .... provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon
State Party to the Treaty ot1the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or an object
of a threat of, <~ggrcssion in which nuclear weapons arc used" [U.N. Docs. S/1995/261-265], and
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As far as other sources declaratory of customary law are concerned, the United States

addressed the many General Assembly Resolutions which condemn nuclear weapons as
contrary to the U.N. Charter (and to international law generally), and which seek their
permanent prohibition. 25
It rejected any assertion, however, that such Resolutions create legally binding

obligations on States, especially since they could not declare custom when "a significant
number of nuclear weapon States have not accepted them."

The more reasonable view, as David points out, is that these Resolutions reflect
ambivalence among non-nuclear weapon States towards two different problems: possession,

and use (or threatened use) of nuclear weapons. Resigned acceptance of the practice of
deterrence does not imply acceptance of their use.
More generally, the whole question of the perception of the role of State consent in
the customary process, as Lobo de Souza has shown, is internationally contested ground,
weakening argument relying on some common understanding of its nature. 26

(b.) " .... will not usc nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on [the United States].
its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security
commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear weapon State in association or alliance with a
nuclear weapon State". [U.N. Doc. A/50/153 (1995)].
The United States asserted that these Statements reserve the right to usc nuclear weapons in certain
circumstances, that they had been noted "with appreciation" by the Security Council in its Resolution 984
(1995), and that they had not been challenged by any State Party to the treaty. At pp. 15-18.
25
Loc. cit., at Note 9, pp.l7-20. The first such Resolution, No.\653 (XVI) of !961 has been followed by many
more, which have appeared annually on the Agenda of Plenary Sessions of the General Assembly since the 33rd
Session in 1978. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, para. 18. 351.L.M. 809 (1996).
26
David, E. (1997). The Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the usc of nuclear
weapons. International Review of the Red Cross, 37 (I), 21-34, at 31. Lobo de Souza, I. (1995) Tile role of
state consent in the customary process. Int. & Comp. L.Q. 44, 521-539, at 539. l11c United Kingdom, in fact,
asserted its view thallhc practice of the General Assembly may be taken as reinforcing the absence of evidence
of an opinio juris on the illegality of nuclear weapons, since it has supported, or even launched, initiatives
leading to Treaties such as lhe Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Loc. cit., at Note 10, p.35.
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2.2.2. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT DO NOT PROIDBIT THE
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

In view of the Court's dispositif,

27

this assertion fanned the pivotal component of the

Pleadings of the nuclear weapon States. While they conceded the applicability of the
intemationallaw of armed conflict, 28 they denied that any part of the humanitarian law of
war prohibited the use of these devices.

29

More specifically, they argued that it

IS

insupportable to contend that nuclear

weapons must, by their nature, transgress the rules of humanitarian Jaw when used in war,
and that the precise nature of each instance of use must be known to the Court to enable it to
judge its legality or otherwise. General evaluations in the abstract were held to be
inappropriate.
Given the known effects of even the smallest nuclear weapon, it is impossible, it is
submitted, to characterise the circumstances of any nuclear explosion as abstract in any way.

27

At Introduction, Chapter II, Section 2.1, J'upra.
Loc. cit., ;~t Note 9, p.2!; Sec also the Written Statement of Russia, at p. 18: "Even if the usc of nuclear
weapons is in principle justifiable - in individual or collective self-defence - that usc shall be made within the
framework of limitations imposed hy humanitarian law with respect to means and methods rf conducting
military activities".
29
Interestingly, evidence in the present Opinion omitted many technical aspects of the effects of nuclear
explosions, although much evidence of this kind accompanied the Written Statements of some States in the
rejected request of the World !i:"-allh Organisation (sec Foreword). It was thus generally more descriptive and
discursive (since the request was from the General Assembly, rather than .:t specialist U.N. organisation).
In essence, the humanitarian law of war embraces " ... general principles of prevention of human suffering that
goes beyond the needs of war". (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wccmmantry, Part III (3): "Outline of
Humanitarian Law" 35 I.L.M. 309 (1996)). It is also encapsulated in Article 22 of the Regulations on Land
Warfare annexed to the IVth Hague Convention of !907 [U.K. T.S. 9 (1910), Cd. 5030):
28

The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.
Its other pre-eminent convemional components, constituted in the Twentieth Century, have been the four 1949
Geneva Convellfions [75 U.N.T.S. 3], and their Protocols I and II of 1977 [1125 U.NT.S. 3, and 1125 U.N.T.S.
609 respectively].
It has been stated that the basic function of all humani!adan law is simply to protect, to the grcu\est possible
extent, the victims of anned conflicts, of whatever nature or cause (McCoubrcy, H. (1990). International
humanitarian law: the regulation of armed conflicts. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, at p. 5). Such a
perspective carries with it the universalist's vision of human rights in international law, and would more easily
incorporate human rights precepts into theju.~ in bello.
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The United States addressed the various rules of customary and conventional
humanitarian and other relevant law used by opponents of nuclear weapons to assert their
illegality. It dealt with them in the following manner: 30

(a.) Attacks on the civilian population.

Civilian injury or damage resulting indirectly from a legitimate military attack, as
such, was not prohibiled.

31

(b.) Indiscriminate weapons.

Modem nuclear weapons can be aimed at specific military targets to achieve a
given military objective. They me not inherently indiscriminate.

(c.) Proportionality.

The disproportion of a nuclear attack would be wholly dependent on its
.

1'

ctrcmnstances:-

td.) Poison weapons.

Nu,, .1r weapons do not violate the prohibition on poison weapons in humanitarian
law, which does not apply to them.~~
30

Loc. cit., at Note 9, pp. 22-34.
The United States pointed here to the fact that the relevant Articles of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva
Convemions of 1949 (for example, those relating to the protection in war of property and the natural
environment, and of civilian~ ~ubjected to reprisal (Articles 48, 51 (6), 52 (1), 53 (c), 54 (4), 55 (2), and 56 (4)
) were never intended to apply to nuclear weapons, as indicated by the lmemational Committee of the Red
Cross in a statement appended to the text of the Draft Additional Protocol. It added that the United States is not
n party to the Protocol, not hnving ratified it. Explicit statements (rather than Reservations) to this effect were
made during negotiation of the Protocol by each nuclear weapon State except China, ar,d no comment or
objection was made from nny source. The relevant question here is why statements of "understandings" were
not converted into Reservations to the Protocols, in terms of the 1969 Vienna Com•emion 011 the raw of
Treaties. [ 1!35 U.N. T.S. 351]. Loc, cit. Note 9, at p.27; Verbatim record of the Oral Submission of the United
States before the Court, 15 November 1995, by Mr. J. H. McNeill, Senior Deputy General Counsel, U.S.
Department of Defense, pp. 92-93. Lac cit., Ch. II, at Note 20.
32 For example, the nature of the threat; the importance of destroying the objective; the charJcter, size and
expected effects of the device, and the magnitude of the expected risk to civilians. Supra, at Note 30, p. 23. The
customary international Jaw rules on necessity and proportionality have their locus classicus in the Caroline
Case, 1841-42 [29B.F.S.P. 1137-1138;30B.F.S.P.l95-196].
JJ The usc of poison in war is addressed by Article 23 (a) of the Hague Regulutirms appended to the 1907
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the LAws and Customs of War on lAnd [Inc. cit., at Note 19] which
prohibits the usc of "poison" or "poisoned weapons". Castren, (cited in Singh, N.- & McWhinney, E. (1989).
Jl
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(e.) The 1925 Geneva Protoco/.

34

Nuclear weapons do not violate the provisions of this important instrument, which
condemns "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and ... all analogous liquids, materials or
devices", and which again does not apply to them.

(f.) Unnecessary suffering.

35

Suffering is only unnecessary when it exceeds that sufficient to achieve a military
objective. Thus, the effects of nuclear weapons, however severe, may be necessary to
accomplish a military mission.

(g.) Environmental effects prohibited by the 1977 Environmental Modification

Convention.

36

Environmental modification in war must entail a demonstrable intent in order to
be caught by the provisions of this instrument.

(h.) Belligerent Reprisals.

The use of nuclear weapons would not be inconsistent with the customary law of
reprisal. 37
(i.) Neutrality.

Nuclear weapons and contemporary imernationallaw (2nd rev. cd.). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, at p. 121)
argues that, since the regulation "especially foriJids" the usc of "poison" or "poisoned weapons", the prohibition
should be considered to br absolU!e.
14
· Supm, Note 19.
H Supra, Chapter I, at Note 40. Also Loc. cit., at Note 19. The concomitant principle, expressed in the St.
Petersburg Declaration of 1868, of avoiding actions which would "render death inevitable" is similarly
discounted in terms of its relevance to nuclear weapons. Loc. cit., at Note 9, p.33.
36
[1125 U.N.T.S. 3] Articles I, 35 (3) and 55 effectively prohibit "environmental modi!ication techniques" for
military or other hostile purposes which have "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects [on the natural
environment] as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party".
37
The customary law principle of bemgerent reprisal has its locus classicus in the Nauli/aa Case (Portugal v.
Germany, 2 R.l.A.A. !012, at p.l026), whose dicta assert that the object of a reprisal must be "to effect
reparation from the offending State for the offence or a return to legality by the avoidance of further offences".
Bowell, cited in Judge Weeramantry's Dissenting Opinion, has proposed that reprisals arc now illegal in terms
of the Charter of the United Nations. Loc. cit., at Note 29. Schwa;zenburger (cited in Singh & McWhinney
(Op. cit., Note 3, p.l 01) ), in respect of the use of prohibited weapons by way of reprisal, comments that:

.... International law docs not limit reprisals to identical acts. The better opinion ... is probably that
reprisals must be proportionate to the offence against which they arc directed.

The inviolability of neutrals is not absolute, and the inevitable violation
consequent on a use of nuclear weapons is speculative and abstract. 38

U). Genocide.
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide

39

requires "intent to destroy ... a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as

such."40 Thus, it does not render nuclear weapons illegal per se.

Apart from universal principles of humanity, application of most of the above turn on
the principles of distinction between combatants and civilians, of proportionality, and of
necessity in humanitarian law. Each one, it is submitted, is capable, in light of their known
effects, of rendering nuclear weapons irretrievably unlawful.

2.2.3.JNTERNAT!ONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS DO NOT PROHIBIT THE USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.
In general terms, both the United States 41 and the United Kingdom 42 disingenuously
asserted their position that conventional law protecting the environment and human rights
has little, if any, relevance for the usc of nuclear weapons.

43

38

Supra, Note 32
[78 U.N.T.S. 277].
40
Ibid, Article II.
41
Loc. cit., at Note 9, pp. 34·46.
41
Loc. cit., at Note 10, pp. 68-71.
43
Some of the most important conventional instruments in the lield of the environment include:
Stockholm Declaration 011 the Human Environment, 1972 [UN Doc. AICONF. 48114 & Corr. I ( 1972)].
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985.[26/.LM. 1529].
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992. [31 I.L.M. 849].
Convelllion on Biological Diversity, 1992. [31 I.L.M. 822].
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992. [UN Doc. NCONF. 151/5/Rcv. J].
39

Their counterparts in the field of human right~ include:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. [UN Doc. A/8 10].
International Covena/11 on Civil and Political Ril;llts, 1966. [UN Doc. A/6316]
lllfernational Covena/11 on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. (UN Doc. A/6316].
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These instruments, they contended, were never intended for this purpose, and cannot

be construed as such. Indeed, their general nature prohibits their construal as specifically

prohibitory of the use of nuclear weapons. 44
Again, they were intended for operation in times of peace, and not m terms of
legitimate armed conflict. 45

2.2.4. THE THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

The nuclear weapon States shared the view that the absence of a prohibition against
nuclear weapons per se must lead to the same conclusion in respect of a threat to use tht-m.

46

They noted that, while little work has been undertaken on the definition of a threat to
use force in terms of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Clwrter,

47

such a threat involves

more than mere possession of a weapon. Even deployment of weapons does not, of itself,
constitute. intent to use, since all States may deploy any weapon in self-defence, individually
or collectively, as provided in Article 51 of the Charter.

/ntemarional Convention on the Elimination of all Fanus of Racial Discrimination, 1966. [60 U.N. T.S. I95}.
Americmt Convent inn on Human Rig/us, 1969. [O.A.S. T.S. No. 361.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979. [UN Doc. N34/46J.
E11ropea11 Conventimlfor the Protection of Human RiRitls and Fundamental Freedoms. 1953 [213 U.N.T.S.
221).
Many others address more specific areas, such as slavery. torture, apartheid and education.
44

The United Kingdom conOatcd the consmml of a particularity from a generality with the caveat that, unless
expressly provided, "a treaty must be construed against the background of [a State'sJ inherent right of selfdefence". It also enlisted the rule that treaties must be applied and interpreted against the background of general
principles of international law, in order to reinforce its argument that legitimate self-defence is a sine qua 11011
for the correct interpretation of all international treaties. Loc. cit., at Note 10, p.63. Cf Article 31 (3) (c) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. [ 1155 U.N. T.S. 331]. This argument must be balanced by
consideration of the intemion of the Parties to any particular treaty, even in mutters bearing upon jus co gens, 62
B. Y.I.L. I (1991), at60.
45
Supra, Note 42. The United States pointed to Article 6 (I) of the Imemational Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 1966, which states: "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of [hisJ life" (sic.) {Emphasis added). It thus ~ought, in a
semantic and self-serving way, to underline the legitimacy of the taking of life in legitimate warfare. Lac, cit., at
Note 9, p.44.
16
' Loc. cU., at Note 9, p.47.
47
Article 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter provides that:
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or usc of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations".

45

Such a conflation of nuclear and conventional weapons reveals a fundamental
contradiction for the nuclear weapon States when they seek, in terms of nuclear deterrence
doctrine, to differentiate qualitatively between the two.

2.2.5. INTERIM SUMMARY.
In summary, the nuclear weapon States submitted that the Court should exercise its
discretion, and decline to give a reply to the request of the General Assembly. 48

However, should the Court reject that assertion, it should nevertheless conclude that
there is no general prohibition in customary or conventional international law against the use
of nuclear weapons, and that their prohibition under the law of armed conflict would depend
on insupportable speculation as to its applicability in an abstract or hypothetical future
situation.

3. ARGUMENT LED BY STATES FOR THE ILLEGALITY OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

These States contended, firstly, that the General Assembly was competent to request
an Advisory Opinion, that the Court was competent to comply, and that it should exercise its
discretion to do so. 49
As to the substance of their arguments, and in contrast with the congruence of
arguments led by the declared nuclear weapon States, those of the

non~nuclear

weapon States

unsurprisingly exhibited a degree of divergence of approach which reflects their own
diversity.

4

R Supra,
49

Notes 6 and 7.
For example, the Written Observations of the Solomon Islands, 19 June 1995, contends that the request fulfils
the requirements of Article 96 of the UN Charter, being a "legal question", and that the pennissive nature of
Article 65 of the Statute of the Court (the enabling provision for Advisory Opinions) should not be invoked,
having regard for the non-binding nature of the Opinion, its practical significance, the strict judicial function of
the Court, and the Court's practice of responding positively to requests seeking legal enlightenment. At pp. 622. Loc. cir., Ch. II, at Note 20. Refer to Appendices I and 2.
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With the notable exception of the Netherlands, 5° lhey presented a collective view that
there are no circumstances in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons may be permitted in
international law.
For analytical purposes, the arguments of States may be divided between:

(a.) Those, of which Australia is representative, which sought to show that nuclear
weapons are, by their nature, illegal in customary international law (and, hence, that it is
unnecessary to address the circumstances of their use, and the applicable law, as separate and
discrete issues), 51 and
(b.) Those, exemplified by the Solomon lslands,

52

which engaged in a wide-ranging

and complex survey of the obligations, rules and practices of international law in order to
deny the legality of these weapons, both per se and in terms of their use.

3.1. ILLEGALITY PER SE.
Australia submitted its belief that the inherent illegality of nuclear weapons in
customary international law leads to the conclusion that it is also illegal to acquire, test or
possess them. It argued that, as a consequence, an obligation exists for all States to move
towards their total elimination, but within an interim framework of stable deterrence. 53
Australia's central proposition was that the most directly relevant principles in the
question before the Court were those embraced by humanitarian law.

54

The threat or use of

nuclear weapons, in view of their nature, their ability to annihilate Mankind, and the

50

Observations of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Written Statement to the Court, 16 June

1995, which follow the United States in terms both of the Court's discretion to hear the Case, and the findings it
was open to hold. Ibid.
Oral Statement on behalf of Australia by the Hon. Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs, The
Hague, 30 October 1995. Personal communication to this author.
52
Supra, Note 49.
53
Loc. cit., at Note 51, pp. I ,2.
54
Ibid., p. 3. Australia asserted that the jurisprudence of the Court has recognised these "fundamental
principles" in, for example, the Coifu Channel Case, [ /.C.J. Reports 1949, p.4] in which the Court referred to
"certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity". These
principles may be broader than any existing treaty provision (in, for example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions).
See also Note 29, supra.

51

47
probability of their proliferation were, in the modem era, contrary to those principles, and
thus to customary international law ,55

Furthennore,

the

progressive restrictions

on

the

manufacture,

acquisition,

deployment, testing and military use of nuclear weapons since 194556 were evidence of
international atlempts ultimately to eliminate them as fundamentally inhumane and
inconsistent with the dictates of public conscience. Taken together with the many
condemnatory General Assembly resolutions,57 Australia assert~d that these instruments
serve to extend the illegality of nuclear weapons, a principle since 1945 de lege ferenda, to
one with the status of lex lata.

Australia supported its assertions with reference to the developing conventional (and
customary) international law of non-derogable human rights, together with the "international
civilian protection law" advanced by the 1977 Protocol! to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
and the growing awareness of the environmental effects of nuclear weapons.58
In essence, Australia soughl to show that these developments confirm the
international community's growing abhorrence of war, and the increasingly high standards it
uses in assessing the humanity of weapons. In turn, this must impact on the dictates of public
conscience, and on customary international law. 59 This is a rare, and welcome,
55

Loc. cit., at Note51, pp. 4-7.
Supra, Notes 21and 22.
51
Supra, Note 25. Australia cited the opinion of Professor Brownlie ( (1990). Principles of public international
law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, at p.l4) that General Assembly Resolutions such as No. 1653 (XVI) of 1961 arc
to be regarded as "law-making." in their effect. Loc. cit., at Note 51, para. 25.
58
Loc. cit., at Note 51, pp. 9-13. The most significant instruments in international human rights and
environmental issues arc listed at Note 43. Many other States dealt extensively with the environmental effects of
nuclear weapons, notably the Solomon Islands. Loc. cit., at Note 49, as did several Dissenting Opinions, notably
that of Judge Wceramantry 35 l.L.M. 809 (1996).
59
Ibid., paras. 26, 27. For the significance of Australia's usc of the phrase "dictntes of public conscience" sec
Chapter II, Scction2.2.3. in regard to the "Martens Clauses" used in international humanitarian law.
Supra, at Note 31. The seminal provisions of Additional Protocol! to the Gene1•a Convemions, now regarded,
in Australia's submission, by the bulk of the international community a~ renecting customary international law,
are:
Article 51 (4) prohibiting "indiscriminate attacks", including:
.... an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

56

Article 54 (2) providing that a State Party may not:
attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural arcus for the production of foodstuffs, crops, live-stock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose

48

acknowledgment of rising absolute standards of morality within the development of
international law.
Australia concluded its Oral Submission with an appraisal of the illegality of the
60
possession of nuclear weapons, together with ti1e obligation of States to eliminate them. As

with other weapons of mass destruction (biological and chemical) their very existence
offended fundamental principles of humanity. 61 Like them, prohibition against their threat or

use must be guaranteed through their destruction, and through prohibition against their

acquisition and possession.
In Australia's view, the forum most effective for these practical refonns must be the
1968 Nuclear
Article VI

62

Non~proliferation

Treaty, specifically its disarmament provisions under

and, by implication, its acceptance of deterrence, and the differential treatment

of nuclear and

non~nuclear

weapon States as continuing principles of international law.

3.2ILLEGALITY IN THREAT OR USE.
The Written Statement of Nauru is an exemplar of the many States which addressed
the various principles and rules of international law to show that nuclear weapons are illegal
in all circumstanccs. 63
Focussing on the jus ad bellum, Nauru pointed to the following sources of law to
support its contention that threats, or use of force are contrary to law:
(a.) United Nations Charter, Article 2 (4). 64

(b.) United Nations Resolutions and Declarations. 65

of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or the adverse Party.
Loc. cit., at Note 51, pp. 13-24.
61
Supra, at Note 19.
62
Article VI states: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures in relation to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control". 79 U.N.T.S. 161. The implications of the Opinion for the NPT will be discussed at Chapter V.
63
Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Nauru, 15 June 1995. Loc. cit., Ch. ll, at Note 20.
64
Ibid., p.3. supra, at Note 47. Article 2 (4) specifically prohibits the threat or usc of force. The only exception
is in individual or collective self-defence, which includes Security Council enforcement measures under Article
51 of the Charter.
60

49

(c.) Collective Security Treaties.

(d.) The Nuremberg Principles.

66

61

(e.) Opinio Juris on the nature of a threat. 68

The Written Statement of the Solomon Islands enlarged on the above in its
concentration on the proposition that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is subject and
contrary to the international Jaw of armed conflict, the jus in bello, having regard for the

nature of the effects of their use, and irrespective of the circumstances in which they are
use d .69

This extensive and
humanitarian law of nations,

fine~grained
70

review of the customary and conventional

and of the wider laws of war, 71 argued forcefully that the

quantitative and qualitative destructive effects of the detonation of nuclear devices are such
that they are rendered illegal in terms of:
65

Ibid., at Note 63, p.7. supra, at Note 57. Malaysia (Written Statement of Malaysia, 19 June 1995) lists 101
General Assembly resolutions between 1946 and 1994 seeking, in general, an end to the threat of nuclear
weapons. Their law-creating eff'!cts arc contested by the nuclear weapon States. Loc. cit., Ch. II, at Note 20.
6
r' Ibid., at Note 63, p.9. Collective security treaties such as the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty arc symbolic of the
obligation to refrain from the threat or usc of force. 63 Stat. 2241; T.I.A.S. No. 1964; 4 Bevans 828; 34 U.N.T.S.
243 ( 1949) Art. I.
67
Ibid., Note 63, at p.IO. The International Law Commission has codified "the principles of international law
recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal" as:
(i.) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation .,f inter-national treaties, agreements or assurances, and
(ii.) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts
mentioned under (i).abovc.
Boyle has stated that these principles "have since been universally considered to constitute an authoritative
statement of the rules of customary international law". Boyle, F. (1986). The relevance of international law to
the "paradox" of nuclear deterrence. Nw. U.L. Rev, 80 (6), 1407-1448, at 1416.
68
Supra, Section 2.2.4; Ibid., at Note 63, pp. 22, 23, 31. Nauru asserted that the concepts of "threat" and "use"
in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter merge in most circumstance. Thus, threat of use is itself a kind of usc, when
" 'threat' is defined as a declaration to inflict punishment. ..in retaliation for, or condi!ional\y upon some action
or course. An indication of probable... violencc to come." In any event, a threat to commit an i\legal act is also
illegal as a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations.
69
Supra, at Note 49.
7
Codified, inter alia, in Regulations annexed to the !907 Hagtte Convention IV, and the 1977 Additional
Protocols I and II to the !949 Geneva Conventions. Loc. cit., at Note 29.
71
For example, the jus ad bellum customary principles of neutrality and reprisal, and !he 1948 Cn11vention on
the Preventio11 and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [78 U.N. T.S. 2771.

°
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(a.) The limitation on the choice of means of attacking the enemy. 72

(b.) The obligation to discriminate between combatants and civilians.

(c.) The prohibition against attacking civilian targets.

73

74

(d.) The prohibition against the use of poisons, or weapons having indiscriminate
effects.

75

(e.) The prohibition against the use of weapons which render death inevitable or
' . 76
cause unnecessary su f 1ermg.

(f.) The prohibition against violating the territorial integrily and neutrality of third

States. 77

(g.) The prohibition against causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the

natural environment. 78

(h.) The obligation to respect the principles of proportionality and humanity.

12
73

74
75

79

Supra, at Note 29.
Supra, at Note 31.

Ibid.
Supra, at Notes 29 and 33. Artielc 51 (4). (5) of Additional Protocol! to the Geneva Convemiorrs. Article 51

(5) (b) prohibits the usc of an indiscriminate wcapo11 causing incidental loss to civilian life or objects which is
excessive in relation to any anticipated military advantage.
76
Ibid. (In tenns of the provisions of the Sr. Petersburg Decfr.ration of 1868).
77
Articles 2 (4) and 74 of the Charter of the United Nations.
78
The general obligation to avoid trans-boundary environmental damage is reflected in the dicta of t~je Trail
Smelter arbitration [United States v. Canada, 3 R.l.A.A., p.l907, (1938 and 1941)]. More recent conventional
instruments arc listed supra, at Note 43.
79
Supra, at Notes 32 and 54. The Caroline Case established the requirement that actions in self-defence must
be necessary and proportionate to the seriousness and danger of the attack defended. (Harris, D. J. (1991).
Cases and materials in international law. (rev. cd.). London: Sweet & Maxwell). [29 B.F.S.P. 1137-1138;
B.F.S.P. 195-196).

51

(i). The prohibition against genocide, or crimes against humanity. 80

The above, it is submitted, represents a comprehensive taxonomy of the international
law applicable in anned conflict, and particularly international humanitarian law. It is also a

powerful exposition of the legal incommensurability of the positions of those States with
nuclear weapons, and those without.

3.3 SUMMARY.

This selective review of the Pleadings of States has served to establish the range of
argument led for and against the question before the Court. It remains, in the substantive
component of the thesis, to examine the individual Opinions of Judges.
It will then be possible, as indicated in the Introduction to this Chapter, to assess the

strengths and deficiencies of the Court's Opinion.

80

Supra, at Note 67. Sec also Section 2.2.2.
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CHAPTER IV.

THE OPINION EVALUATED.

1. INTRODUCTION.

A review of the Opinions of individual Judges will complete an examination of the
extent of fact, and of applicable law available to the Court, enabling a range of nonnative
judgments concerning the comprehensiveness, coherence and jurisprudential continuity of
the Opinion.

2. DISSENTING AND OTHER OPINIONS.

As previously noted, all fourteen Judges appended individual Opinions or Statements
to the Court's Judgment. In general terms, they confined their remarks to the material
presented before the Court, and did not seek to introduce substantially novel perspectives or
interpretations to the application of relevant law to available fact.

1

However, a sample of individual Opinions from Judges who voted on each side of
the question, while instructive, is anomalous to the extent that several Judges appear to have
held views at odds, in some degree, with their recorded votes. 2 Nevertheless, and whatever

1

This is an example of the unsurprising juridical caution of the International Court of Justice. Nagendra Singh,
a former President of the Court, has stated, significantly, that the Court must, in his view, acknowledge the
principle )11ra novit curia. Nevertheless, it is limited in its ability to contribute to the progressive development
of international law through the need to guard its judicial integrity by not anticipating the law before it is laid
down by legislators. Judgments sub specie legis ferenda would violate the essential canons of adjudication.
(Singh, N. ( 1989). The role and record of the lmernational Court of Justice. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, at
pp. 174-5).
2
This may be a consequence of the complex internal arrangements used by the Court in the development of a
Judgment which represents the majority view of its members. In general terms, these procedures aim
progressively to develop a Judgment which will attract majority support in the Court (whose member Judges
must, as a coll~gial court, bear joint responsibility for its jurisprudence). They arc outlined by Singh (Op. cit., at
Note I, pp. 383-5).
The most striking example is contained in President Bedjaoui's Declaration. Although he voted in favour of
operative paragraph: 105 (2) E, he was constrained to state: " .... the Court's inability to go beyond the
conclusion it reached cannot in any manner be interpreted as having opened the door to the recognition of the
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their final decision, each individual Judge brought to the collegiate Advisory Opinion a
complexity of judicial argument and relevant law which, as obiter dicta, enlarges and

explains it.
For example, Judge Oda, in his Dissenting Opinion, was concerned to point out that
principles of judicial propriety and economy should have led the Court to decline to give an
Opinion. 3 He contended that the question was political in nature, more suited to negotiation
between States in Geneva or New York than in a curial setting at The Hague, and that the
Opinion had the potential to damage the Court's credibility with the international
community. 4 Significantly, he went on to place the Opinion withi11 the context of the 1968

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and the continuing failure to conclude a Convention
prohibiting any use or threat of use cf nuclear weapons. 5
Several Judges emphasised the fact that, for the first time, the Court had stated
unambiguovsly that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the international law
of armed conflict, and particularly to the principles and rules of humanitarian law. 6 Others
indicated that the natural right of a State to self-defence cannot be denied by the United
Nations Charter, nor by any conventional or customary rule. As a consequence, resort to
nuclear weapons in extremis cannot be denied in law. 7
Judge Weeramantry, in an extensive and discursive review of law and fact, concluded
that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was illegal in any circumstances whatsoever,
being the very negation of the humanitarian concerns lying at the heart of humanitarian law.

legality of the threat or usc of nuclear weapons." (AI para. II). President Bcdjaoui took the view that the
Court's dispositifwas the inevitable result of its application of the law as it is today (At para.9, both in French).
Of those seven Judges who, with President Bedjaoui's casting vote, fanned the majority in favour of the
operative paragraph of this judgment (105 (2) E ), Judges Herczegh, Ferrari Bravo and Ranjeva disapproved, in
varying degree, with the thrust of that paragraph, and said as much in their respective Separate Opinion and
Declarations. Conversely, of those voting against, three (Schwebel, Guillaume and Higgins), according to their
individual Opinions, appeared to be fundamentally in favour of the implications of that paragraph. 35 I.L.M.
809 (1996). Condorelli, L. (1997). Nuclear weapons: a weighty matter for the International Court of Justice.
lnten;ational Revie\V of the Red Cross, 37. (I), 9-20, at 10.
3
Available fan line] at http:f/www.dfat.gov.aulild/icj-nuc/oda-a.html, at paras. 47-54.
4
Ibid., para. 52.
5
Ibid., at Note 3, Parts I and II; Chapter III, at Note 21. [79 U.N. T.S. 161] Although Judge Oda concurred with
the nuclear weapons States, in that he believed no Opinion should have been given, he nonetheless voted
against the operative Paragraph 105 (2) E of the dispositif.
6
35/.L.M. 809 (1996). Judges Weeramantry, Koroma, Ranjeva and Vereschctin were among those held this to
be the case.
7
Ibid. Judge Guillaume, Individual Opinion, Paragraph 8.
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He undertook a comprehensive discussion of the scientific and technical effects of the
detonation of fission and fusion devices on human beings and their environment, and

applauded the Court's acknowledgment of the relevance of nuclear weapons to the
environmental strictures of the 1977 Additional Protocol/ to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 8

Again, Vice-President Schwebel expressed his opinion that the use of nuclear
weapons did not necessarily violate humanitarian law in extreme cases of self-defence, even
though "the deaths of many millions of people through indiscriminate inferno and farreaching fallout" could not be accepted as lawful. 9
In short, the views of individual Judges of the Court, as expressed in their Dissenting
and other Opinions, echoed lhe widely divergent views of States represented before it, but
did not (with the exception of the principle of extreme

self~defence)

seek to introduce

elements of law which had not previously formed a part of the jurisprudence of the Court.

3. THE OPINION REVIEWED.
It is now possible, in light of the material set out in the Opinion itself, the Pleadings
of States before the Court, and the Dissenting and other Opinions and Statements of
individual Judges, to fonn conclusions concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the
Advisory Opinion.
The Opinion appears, prima facie, as a compromise between two incommensurate
positions. In its dispositif, the Court found, firstly, that it could fmd no specific authorisation
for the threat or use of nuclear weapons in customary nor conventional law (as contended by
those States without such weapons). 10 Conversely, it could find no "comprehensive nor
8

Ibid., at Note 6. Judge Wccramantry, Dissenting Opinion, Part II. Sec also his Appendix, Sections (a.), and
(b.) (in relation to Paragraph 3 I of the Court's Opinion. Additional Protocol!, Articles 35 (3) and 55). Judge
Wceramrmtry's Dissenting Opinion is a careful refutation of each argument advanced by the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France in support of their position, touching on deterrence, reprisals, internal wars, the
doctrine of necessity, discriminatory nuclear weapons, and the relevance of the Nuclear Norl·proliferation
Treaty in an 88 page Dissent. Weiss, P. (1996). Notes on a misunderstood decision: the World Court's near
perfect Adliisory Opinion in the Nuclear Weapon Case. Unpublished paper. International Association of
Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms: New York.
9
International Court of Justice Communique No. 96/23 ( 1996, 8 July). Legality of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons. (Request for Advisory Opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations): Adliisory Opinion.
Annex, at p.5.
10
Lnc. cit., at Note 6. Paragraph 105 (2) A of the Advisory Opinion. Decided unanimously. 'Ific precise text of
the Court's dispmitifmay be found at Chapter II, Section 2.1.
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universal" prohibition within the same sources, as asserted by the declared nuclear weapon
States.

11

Thirdly, it found, unanimously, that any threat or use of force involving nuclear

weapons in violation of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits such
action "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" is unlawful. It
found the same to be true in terms of a threat or use of force which did not meet the selfdefence requirements of Article 51 of the Charter. 12
Fourthly, and unanimously, it found that any such action should comply with the

principles and rules of international humanitarian law (emphasis added), and with the terms
of the lex specialis of conventional instruments specific to nuclear weapons. 13
Finally, in the operative Paragraph of the Opinion, and by the narrowest of simple
majorities, the Court found, following from the above, that a threat or use of nuclear
weapons would generally be contrary to the mle.; of international law applicable in armed
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law (emphasis added).
It attempted to enlarge on its caveat by concluding its Judgment with a non liquet, in
which it averred its inability, given the current state of international law, and of the elements
of fact at its disposal, to conclude definitively whether such action would be lawful or
unlawful in a circumstance of self-defence which threatened the survival of a State. 14 It may
be observed here parenthetically that this final holding can be construed as a concession to

11

Ibid., Paragraph 105 (2) B. By !!Ieven votes to three. Judges Shahabuddecn, Wccramantry nnd Koroma
demurred.
12
Ibid., Paragraph 105 (2) C. The United Kingdom asserted that the usc of force is not prohibited by Article 2
(4) if it is authorised by n competent organ of the United Nations {presumably the Security Council), or if it is
undertaken in the exercise of self-defence as defined by Article 51. Written Statement of the United Kingdom,
p.34, para. 3.33.
0
Ibid., Paragraph 105 (2) D. The usc of "should" rather than "must" tends to mitigotc the slrcngth nf this
finding, since "should" has, as ils mos\ common meaning in modern English, the sense "ought to" rather !han
anylhing stronger. Collins E,tglish Dictionary (1990). (rev. ed.). London: Harper Collins. This is capable of
construal as an a\tcmpt to accommodate two irreconcilable positions in respect of the relevance of humanitarian

Jaw.
14
Ibid., Paragraph I 05 {2) E. Those Judges in favour: President Bcdjaoui (Algeria); Judges Ranjcvn
{Mnlagasy); Herczcgh (Hungary); Shi (China); Fleischhaucr {Germany); Vcrcschetin (Russia) and FcrrariBravo (Italy).
Those against: Vice-President Schwebel (United Stntes); Judges Oda (Japa11); Guillaume (France);
Shnhabuddccn (Guyana); Wceramantry {Sri Lanka); Koroma (Sierra Leone) and Higgins (United Kingdom).
The fifteenth position on the Bench was vacnnt, following the death of Judge Aguihr-Mawdslcy {Venezuela) in
November 1995. He was replaced by Judge Parra-Aranguren {Vcne7.llcla), who was clcctct.i in Fcb;·,~nry I99fi.
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nuclear weapon States, and to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. It may also be seen as
lending precedence to the survival of a single State over that of the rest of humanity.

3.1. EVALUATION OF THE OPINION.
What, then, are the strengths and weaknesses of the Opinion? As noted above, it is
capable of interpretation by the nuclear weapon States as acknowledgment of their general
position with regard to nuclear weapons: that there are foreseeable circumstances in which a

use of nuclear weapons in war would not be illegal. By the same token, the Court's
perplexing inability to declare such an action illegal in all cases without exceptiml may be
interpreted as a significant rebuff to the rest of the international community.

3.1.1. THE COURT'S DICTA.
The Opinion's greatest strength may be its dicta, expressed in Paragraphs 79 and 85,
that the body of international humanitarian law contained in major conventions is, in
essence, general and customary international law, and that it applies to nuclear weapons in
the same way as to any other weapon. 15
Paragraph 79 states:

It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable
in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and
"elementary considerations of humanity" as the Court put it in its Judgment
of 9th April I 949 in the Corfu Channel case (I.C.J. Reports I 949. p.22), that
the Hague and Geneva Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession. Further
these fundamental rules arc to be observed by all States whether or not they
have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intra-nsgressible principles of international customary law. 16
Condorclli notes that the expression "intransgressible principles of international law"
seems to suggest that the Court was attempting by its jurisprudence to bring the status of

15
16

Humanitarian law is understood here as a sub-division of the jus in bello.
Loc, cit., at Note 6,
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humanitarian law closer to jus cogens, while not attempting its inclusion within that
domain. 17 As will be discussed in Chapter V, this result has far·reaching implications for the
legal status of the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and for the doctrine of deterrence
in international law.

A second important characteristic of the Opinion is its treatment of the distinction
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 18 It is possible to read paragraph 105 (2) E of the

disposit{f (paraphrased above) as discriminating between the two when, by well established
principle and custom, they have equal status, and must both be satisfied before a use of force
is lawful. In other words, necessary and proportionate self-defence by means prohibited in
humanitarian law would be unlawful.
It appears that the Court has, by its non liquet, allowed the possibility that a use of
nuclear weapons (which, it is submitted, would violate the humanitarian components of jus

in bello) could, in undefined circumstances, be justified by a principle of jus ad bellum (that
of extreme self-defence). 19 There is room here for concern about the negative impact of this

17

Supra, nt Note 2, p. 17. At Paragraph 83, the Court declined to rule on the jus co gens nature of humnnitnrinn
lnw since the question of its legal chnmctcr, per .re. wns not nt issue.
18
The jus ad be !fum comprises, in the modern era, the principles of lnwful self-defence against unlawful
aggression embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Its origin is found in the medieval principle of "just
war", ns further developed by Grotius in the curly pnrt of the Seventeenth Century. Its focus, in order to impose
limits on a State's ability to resort to war, was plnccd principa!ly on the authority nnd state of mind of the
person declaring war, the condition and intentions of tho~c waging war, the justice of the cnusc of war, and the
deserts of those against whom it was wllgcd. Kingsbury, B., & Roberts, A. (1992). Introduction: Grotian
thought in international rel;~tions. In H. Bull, B. Kingsbury & A. Rob1:rts (Eds.), Hugo Grotius and
international relations (pp. 20-21 ). Oxford: Clorendon Press.
The jus in bello addresses the means by which war JTillY be pursued, and encompasses the principles of
humanitarian Jaw applicable in war; the Hague nnd Geneva Conventions, Protocols and Regulations, and other
instruments which codify customary low (and more directly so, in view of the present Advisory Opinion).
19
Greenwood has plllyed down the signilicance of this apparent disjunction, which would, he asserts, threaten a
return to a Grotian conception of just war in plnce of the United Nations Charter provisions on use of force. He
does not concede the proposition that all usc of nuclear weapons would transgress humanitarian law.
Greenwood, C. (1997). The Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons and the contribution of the International
Court to international humanitarian law. Loc. cit., at Note 2, 65-75.
The opposite view is put cogently by Judge Shahllbuddeen, who, noting that the Court has recognised that the
destructive power of nuclear weapons, unrestroincd in splice or time, noncthclc5s is overborne in its judgment
by the principle of resort to self-defence, or "State survival", stated:

It would ... seem curious thnt a World Court should consider itself t'ompcllcd by law to reach the
conclu:.ion thnt a state hns the legal right, even in limited circumstllnce, to put the planet to dcllth .....
(Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddecn, PnrtiV: "Conclusion", at p. 29. We. cit., at Note 2).
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equivocation on the

Court'~

standing in the international community. Such an outcome

would be regrettable, especially as the result of its putative, and surprising, inability to
ascertain the law applicable to a case before it.
Nevertheless, that may be the consequence of the devel0prnent of the Court's
jurisprudence through the evolution of the entirely new principle of the survival of a State
which, it may be argued, is a retrograde step for a Court which completed its Judgment with
a call for comprehensive nuclear disannament.

20

It also calls into question the regime of self-

defence enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.
While it is undeniably "the job of the Court ... to apply the law as it is." 21 it must
also, in Nagendra Singh's words, be "very careful and selective of the time and the
circ~;:;-<;tances

in which it could proceed to look to the developmental aspect of the law it

administers" _I?.. This may be one occasion on which the Court has over-stepped the bounds of
prudence, and is a second negative aspect of the Opinion.
A more basic criticism, and one discussed by Judge Koroma in his Dissenting
Opinion, 23 concerns its focus on the nature of the legal matter before it. The Court was asked
whether it is lawful to use nuclear weapons, and not about the juridical priority to be
assigned to the survival of a State. In Judge Koroma's words; " ... the Court flinched and
failed to reach the only and inescapablr finding" [that the usc of nuclear weapons is
prohibited in all circumstances by the rules of humanitarian law ]. 24
Further notable dicta in the Opinion are derived from its treatment of international
human rights and environmental law. While neither was held to be substantively decisive in
the Court's deliberations, nonetheless, both domains of law were relevant to its reasoning,
and both were strengthened by the Opinion.25

It will be recalled that the United States and the United Kingdom were dismissive of
the relevance of each domain to the threat or use of nuclear weapons. 26 Other States, such as

20 Pamgraph I05 (2) F of the Court's dispositif. Loc. cit., at Note 2.
21
Supra, at Note 19, p.75. See also Note I,
22
Loc. cit., at Note I, p. 175.
23
Loc. cit., at Note 2, pp. 4 , 18.
24

25

Ibid.

Some of the most important international conventional instruments in the lields of human rights and the
environment are listed at Chapter III, Note 43.
26
Chapter III, at Section 2.2.3.
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the Solomon Islands and Egypt, held that a nonMderogable right to life exists at all times in
terms of international human rights instruments,

27

and that the many treaties aimed at the

protection of human health and the environment have attracted such widespread accession as
now to reflect rules of customary law .28

The Court addressed the relevance of the right to life at Paragraphs 24 and 25 of its
Opinion and, while affirming that human rights law continues to apply in war, went on to
place the test of what constitutes "arbitrary deprivation of life" for determination in terms of

"the law applicable in armed conflict, which is designed to regulate the conduct of
hostilities".

29

In other words, human rights rules are to be interpreted in terms of

humanitarian law, bringing them ftrmly within that domain in the context of armed conflict.
This is a significant advance for the status of human rights rules generally, and in particular
311

.
I ng
. ht to 1·'
t he umvcrsa
I1C."

As for environmental law, the Opinion has strengthened greatly its emerging status as
a body of rules which, given the wide adoption of the 1992 Rio Declaration, must now be
taken seriously into account when action is contemplated which would conflict with its
~l<r:•Jres. 3 t
27

Cf Article 6 (I), lntematinnal Cm·enant on Cil'il and Political Rights, 1966 [999 U.N.T.S. 171). Wriuen
Comment!> of Egypt on Other Wrillen Statements, September, 1995, at pp. 27, 28, in which Egypt noted that
this Article provides :
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by Jaw.
No one shall he arbitrarily deprived of [his] life [sic].
It also cited Article 40 of the Fo11rth Geneva Convention, 1949 [75 U.N. T.S. 287], which states "[i]t is
~rohibited to order that there shall be no survivors". Loc. cit., Ch. Ill, at Note 20.
8
Ibid. Written Observations of Solomon Islands, 20 June 1995, at p.86. paras. 4.21-4.30 .. This view renects
the position of the "revolutionist" or Kantian theorists of internntional relations; those who chnmpion the
tmnscendcnce of individun!s ns the superior moral and political agents in the world. Such a position is a basic
premise of the international law of human rights. A broad discussion of this vital area of the legal and
philosophical sub~structurc of human rights can be found in: Shcstak, J. 1. ( 1985). The jurisprudence of human
rights. InT. Mcron (Ed.), /fa man rights in international law. (pp. 69- II~). Oxford: O.U.P.
29
Loc. cit., at Note 2, para. 25.
30
One commentator has drawn attention to the fact that such a conflation of rT>~~ iwo spheres of law is less
comfortable when associated with the rights of those in the custody of an "authvriry'. Here, human rights treaty
bodies have tended to ignore the Geneva Conventions, and applied the human rights texts within their own
terms. Doswald-Beck, L. ( 1997). International humanitarian law and the Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or usc of nuclear weapons. Loc. cit., nt Note 2. 35~55, at 52.
31
[UN. Doc. A/CONF. 151/Rev.l]. In addition to environmental law instrument~. per se, the ter'll
"environmental law" is used here to include those provisions of Geneva Law which regulate the eftCcts of
conflict on the natural environment, such as Article 35, paragraph 3 of Additional Protocol /, 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, and conventional law having the same effect (such as the 1977 Convention on the
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This principle is clear when the Court states:
The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States
or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international
law relating to the environment. 32
The Court emphasised the fact that environmental treaties could not have been
intended to deprive a State of its right of self-defence, but that they must be taken into
account when assessing whether "an action is in confonnity with the principles of necessity

and proportionality" .:n
In summary, then, the Opinion has considerable merit in terms of its enunciation of

dicta whose effect is to strengthen and extend the reach of international humanitarian, human
rights and environmental law, both customary and conventional, in their application to the
international law of armed conflict.
These advances are tempered by the Court's confusing treatment of the relationship
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, its finding of a non liquet on a question which it had
not been asked to address, and its "legislative" development of a principle of extreme
circumstances of self-defence involving the survival of the State.
This last criticism, as noted above, has wide ramifications for the entire regime of
self-defence in the international community and, most importantly, must be seen in light of
the status of the doctrine of deterrence in its relationship to customary and conventional
international law. Indeed, lhe issues surrounding this question lie at the heart of the Opinion
and its significance for nuclear disarmament.

Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. [ 1125 U.N. T.S. 3]
).
32

UH:. cit,, at Note 2, paragraph 29.
/bid., paragraph 30. Doswald-Bcck has pointed to the ambiguity c>f the reference to "necessity and
proportionality", which the Court may have intended as a reference to this principle in the general context of the
law of self-defence, or alternatively to the principle of proportionality of collateral damage in humanit<~rian law.
If the latter, she contends, this means, in effect, that "environment" is a "civilian object", the damage to which
must be proportionate to the value of a military objective. Tbis argument appears redundant to the extent that it
seems unnecessary to extend the scope or range of "civilian objects", in the sense of artefacts and service
providers, already afforded protection by "Geneva Law". Ibid., at Note 30.

33

---------------

--- ---
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3.1.2. COHERENCE OF ARGUMENT IN THE OPINION.
The coherence of the reasoning and argument presented in the text of the Opinion
should be understood with reference to the evidence of fact before the Court, and of the
relevant law available for application to that evidence.
In generai terms, the deficiencies apparent in the raciocination and analyses made by

the Court are all the more perplexing when viewed against the Opinion in toto. There is no
doubt that the Court uildressed the broad span of spheres or domains of law which might
apply to a question concerning the legality of a threat or use of force employing a weapon of

mass destruction. It had been addressed at length on the question by 43 States in written
statements, and by 23 of those States in oral submissions. 34 Its own jurisprudence, that of its
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the composition of its
distinguished Bench combined to ensure that such was the case. 35 However, when viewed at
the level of specific applicable law, anomalous and contradictory reasoning begins to appear.
The Court began with a convincing discussion of its jurisdiction, and of its discretion
to hear the matter. An examination of its Statute, and an extensive review of the Court's
jurisprudence, led it with little difficulty to a positive conclusion.36
It moved on to consider relevant law, visiting each of the substantive arguments of
States for and against the applicability of a wide range of international law norms,

37

and

identifying (apparently without consulting its own jurisprudence) the United Nations Charter
provisions on the usc of force, the law of am1ed conflict, and specific treaties on nuclear
weapons as the law most relevant to the question posed.
There is little with which to take issue tc this point. However, when it approached
more closely each area of law, the Opinion's flow of reasoning became less certain. For
example, its examination of the principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed
34

Mohr, M. (1997). Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the usc of nuclear
weapons under international law. Loc. cit., al Note 2, 92-J02, at 94.
JS These comments arc intended lo indicate the general comprehensiveness of the text of the Opinion, ralher
than that of the individual opinions, or alternative commentaries, of Judges, which vary greatly in length and
thoroughness. The text of the Opinion is summarised at Chapter II, Section 2
36
Loc. cit., at Note 2. Paragraphs JO- 19 of the Opinion.
37
Ibid., Paragraphs 23 - 34 of the Opinion. The general taxonomy in this regard consisted of: international
human rights law, prohibitions against genocide, internalional environmental Jaw, Uniled Nations Charter
provisions on the usc of force, the Jaw of armed conflict, and specific treaties dealing with nuclear weapons.
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conflict is both comprehensive and rigorous. 38 However, its conclusion, at Paragraph 95, that
the use of nuclear weapons was "scarcely reconcilable with respect for [the requirements of

international humanitarian law]" is followed by the observation that:
Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not have sufficient elements
to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would

necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law applicable in
anned conflict in any circumstance (emphasis added).
What is lacking in this instance is any indication of the circumstances which would
allow the lawful use of nuclear weapons. 39 The Court, lacking sufficient information with
which to judge the best position, on either side of the question, would have been better
served had it been swayed by its own argument as to incommensurability of principles of
humanity and the detonation of nuclear devices.
The reluctance of the Court to follow the lines of its argument to their most logically
defensible conclusion is reflected in the non liquet of the second limb of the operative
Paragraph of the dispositif. While the practical consequences of the Opinion's non-finding
may be apparent to all interested parties, nonetheless it appears open to hold that, given the
legal and factual tools at its disposal, the Court's apparently disabled jurisprudence lacks
coherence. It is simply not supported by the text which leads to its terms. 40
Of the many altemative ways of establishing this conclusion, perhaps the most
cogent, given the central position of humanitarian law in the Opinion, is to indicate, with
respect, the manner in which the Court could have approached its treatment of this area of
law.

It had first to determine whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is lawful in
relation to the humanitarian law protecting combatants, and then to address that which
protects civilians in war. This is a vital first step in any analysis, since the principle of

Ibid., Paragraphs 74 -87 of the Opinion.
This deficiency is echoed in the first limb of Paragraph 105 (2)E of the Court's dispositif, where the tenn
"generally" in relation to the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons in war is left without any
explanatory addendum (or apologia).
40
Several Judges asserted this to be the case in Dissenting Opinions. e.g. Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen, al Part VI, Conclusion. 35/.L.M 809 (1996),

JR
39
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discrimination between the two is a fundamental component of international humanitarian

law.

41

Having done so, the Court could then have judged whether nuclear weapons cause
suffering which is "unnecessary" in terms of the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration,42 and the

Hague Regulations of 1907.43
Finally, the Court would then have been in a position to address the issue of the
claimed indiscriminate effects of nuclear weapons, which would bear upon the prohibition
against attacking civilians if unavoidable civilian casualties were expected to result from a
rru']'ttary attac k.44

Had the Court proceeded in this way, it is difficult to believe that it would have
reached the conclusion contained in Paragraph 95 (above).

4. CONCLUSION.
A selective survey of the individual opinions and statements of Judges has been used
in conjunction with the pleadings of States, and the Opinion itself, to review and evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of the Opinion in terms of its dicta, the continuity of its
jurisprudence, and the coherence of its argument.
It remains to place the Advisory Opinion in the wider context of its importance for
the international community of nations within the United Nations system. There can be no
doubt that the Opinion carries great legal, political and moral significance for the prospects

41

1977 Protocol/ to the !949 Geneva Conventions, [1 I25 U.N. T.S. 3], states at Article 48:
Parties to ... connie! shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objects and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.

" [ 138 C.T.S. (1868-69: LXIV U.K.P.P. (1869) 659].
43
Hague Regulations on Land Warfare annexed to !907 Hague Convention IV. [205 C.T.S. (1907) 227;
U.K.T.S. 32 (1910) Cd. 5030].
44
Mohr has pointed to the fact that the principle of proportionality, per se, would not unconditionally exclude

any recourse to nuclear weapons in self-defence (although it is very difficull to conceive of a circumstance in
which it could sanction such use). The Court has distinguished between this principle and international
humanitarian law (to which reference must ultimately be made in determining lawfulness), However,
humanitarian law is itself innucnccd by the principle of proportionality, which provides its linkage to the
Charter law of jus ad bellum. This is tantamount to conceding that aggressive use of nuclear weapons is always
disproportionate andlbecause it is conti·ary to international humanitarian law. Lac. cit., Note 34, at 97.
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of nuclear non-proliferation and disannament in the opening years of the

Tw~~nty-first

Century.

From this perspective, the ways in which it affects or modulates efforts in these
directions will be of immense importance, not only for the future standing and relevance of
the International Court of Justice, but also for the success of international efforts to moderate

and confine aggressive use of force through legal and moral strictures, as well as by political

means.

'i,
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CHAPTERV.

CONCLUSION: OUTCOMES. RELEVANCE AND IMPACT.

1. INTRODUCTION.

The final Chapter of the thesis will draw together the threads of argument, dispute
and evidence in order to assert a range of implications and possible (or imputable) outcomes

flowing from the Advisory Opinion. The breadth and depth of issues surrounding its genesis,
direction and resolution are sure indicators of its importance on the widest international
scale.

With that in mind, it will focus, firstly, on the most important direct implications of
the Court's Opinion. This will encompass some consideration of its impact on perceptions of

the Court's judicial independence and integrity as an integral component of the United
Nations Organisation, together with implications for the Court's ability to develop
international law through its jurisprudence. The thesis will also consider its significance for
the future of the regime of deterrence surrounding the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation

Treaty, 1 the prospects of comprehensive nuclear disarmament, and perceptions of the
principles of self-defence in international law.
Secondly, and in a more general or contextual sense, the thesis will consider the
importance of the Opinion as a commentary on the post-World War II development of public
international law, and on the plural model of international relations offered, respectively, in
Chapters I and II.

Finally, it will close with a general appraisal of the Opinion in terms of the alternative
findings that were open for the Court to hold.

1

Loc. cit., Ch. III, at Note 21. Hereafter tenned "NPT''.
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2.1. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY.
The dual questions of the Court's integrity, and of its ability to maintain its judicial

independence within the United Nations system, generate a range of theoretical and practical
conundra. That does not disqualify them from consideration, not least because the present

Opinion, as much as judgments in compulsory jurisdiction, illustrates many of the dilemmas
faced by the Court.
Its very nature as a collegial international court, reflecting on its Bench widely
disparate legal, political, social and cultural systems, encourages a perception that its judges

will discharge their duties in some nationally-determined way? Such an assertion is by no
means obvious, although it is possible to argue that the Court's record over the past decade,
especially concerning the continuity of its jurisprudence, indicates that politically-motivated
pressures upon it, whether implicit or more forcefully expressed, may be growing.
In such circumstances. it is increasingly vital, in terms of the Court's judicial
independence, and relevance for the development of international law, that it resist with the
full weight of its judicial, statutory and moral authority all attempts at extra-juridical
influence from States.
This aim was not assisted by its Judgment in the Nicaragua Case," in which, as
Reisman has indicated, the Court used a truncated citation of its own jurisprudence in order
to leave the impression that it was thereby entitled to reach judgment in a non-appearance
case (pursuant to Article 53 (2) of its Statute) without satisfying itself that the applicant
State's factual claims were well-founded. Having regard to the full extent of its

2

Judge Manfred Lachs, a fanner President of the International Court of Justice (1973-1976}, has stated that
judges of the Court. have, through their training, experience, impartiality and conscience, displayed a level of
objectivity, detachment, disinterest and lack of bias which confounds the frequent claims made, especially in the
world's press, that the J.C.J. is nothing more than a "legal" Security Council. His comments were made in the
context of the debate among American jurists following the Nicaragua Case of 1986 [Nicaragua v. United
States, J.C.J.Reports, 1986, p.4.]. He indicates examples of the Court's unanimous judgments to illustrate his
point (which is reinforced by the unanimous voting recorded on all but one limb of the dis;wsitifin the present
Opinion). While ack;ww]edging the fact that many of its detractors arc motivated by an aversion against
allowing any foreign involvement in sovereign State interests, he emphasises the Court's primary goal of global
representation, rather than any out-moded conception of it as "a like-minded, Western-oriented club". Lachs,
M. (1987) A few thoughts on the independence of judges of the International Court of Justice. Col. 1. Trans. L
25 (3), 593-600.
3
Loc. cit., ibid., at Note 2.
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4

5

jurisprudence, it was not so entitled. As discussed in Chapter IV, the present Opinion

contains examples of equally impaired (and puzzling) jurisprudence.
In the face of growing concerns for the future judicial independence and perceived
integrity of the Court as it fulfils it remit, the premises underlying this discussion must be
brought constantly to the fore: that the juridical resolution of legal disputes, and the Court's

central role in that process, are fundamental to any hope for a peaceful world. All States must
have confidence in the procedural and substantive probity of all aspects of its work.

6

2.1.1. JURISPRUDENTIAL EVOLUTION.
The Court's most important relationship, from both a judicial and political/diplomatic
7

perspective, is that with the United States. International legal idealism will not alter this
reality. As a consequence, its ability to develop or direct the growth and universal influence
of public international Jaw, especially in the domain of the use of force in international
relations, was severely curtailed by the United States' withdrawal from the Court's
compulsmy jurisdiction in the 1986 Nicaragua Case. 8

4

Refer to Appendix 2. The Court, in Nicaragua, invoked the Corfu Channel Judgment {(U.K. v. Albania) l.C.J.
Reports 1949, p.248] as l!uthority for a partial default judgment in the l!bsence of extensive questions of fact
from the United States (which had withdrawn its limited accession to the "Optional clause" of the I.C.J. Statute
(contained in Article 36) and absented itself from proceedings). In doing so, however, it omiltcd to cite its
coterminous dicta thm, in satisfying itself that the applicant State's claim is well-founded, it should have resort
to methods different from those the absent defendant might have used. Reisman, W. M. (1989). Respecting
one's own jurisprudence: A plea to the International Court of Justice. 83 A.J.l,L. 312 (1989). At 312-314.
5
At Section 3.!.2.
6
Gordon has described the Court's character in the following way:
The Court is unique: a hybrid of arbitral tribunl!l, legal adviser and court of law; of trial and
appellate court; of "principle judicial mgan" of the United Nations and autonomous adjudicative
body; of civil law and common law formalities and techniques; of diplomacy and law. Its jurisdiction
is not so muc.ll prescribed by constitution or statute, as it is created, in effect, by contract with and
among the parties ... [as] independent states ..... virlul!!ly every case the Court hears is of a
"political" nature .... ,
Gordon, E. (1987). Legal disputes under Article 36 (2) of the Statute. In L.F. Damrosch (Ed.), The
International Court of Justice at a crossroads (pp.l83-222). Dobbs Ferry: American Society of International
Law. At p.l85. This hints at the undo,Jbted importance of non-judicial methods of dispute resolution, such as
negotiation, good offices, mediation, conciliation and arbitration in universal U.N. or regional fora.
7
Not least in view of its predominance over the administrative and financial functions of the United Nations
Organisation, of which the I.C.J. is a component.
8
Loc cit., at Note 2. On 8 October 1985 the United States withdrew its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction
under its "Optional Clause" Declaration in terms of Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the Court. It offered the
following explanation:
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America's subsequent ambivalence and caution in several contentious cases9 has, it is
submitted, continued in the present Opinion. As its written and oral statements show, the
United States displayed a cautious, legally conservative (and, paradoxically, functionalist)
approach to its evidence on this most fundamental of questions. 10

Until confidence in the impartiality and utility of the Court m a politically and
socially divided world is engendered in, or returns to, the governments of the world's
powerful nations, 11 its jurisprudential potential will remain truncated.

2.2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, NON-PROLIFERATION AND
DISARMAMENT.

The issues surrounding nuclear deterrence strategies, the reg1me of nuclear nonproliferation, and comprehensive nuclear disarmament can be condensed to form a single
discourse - that which was placed before the Court in the present Opinion by the opposing
claims of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States.
The dispute, examined extensively in Chapters II, Ill and IV, may be summarised as a
fundamental disagreement between the two sides about the legitimacy of discriminatory
approaches towards a type of weapon which confers immense powers and responsibilities on
its manipulators, and incalculable danger on all States.
Essentially, those States which possess nuclear weapons have arrogated to
themselves the right to continue lawfully to do so (and have expressed an intention to usc
them, at any time, in self-defence). Other States have agreed not to acquire them, on the

(I). The majority of other nations (most notably the Soviet Union and its allies) had never accepted the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction.
(2). The Court had been misused for politit:ai reasons (emphasis added).
(3). Continued acceptance was contrary to... the principle of the equal application of the law.
(4). [Continued acceptance] would endanger the United Stales' vital national interests.
Lutz, R.E. (1991). Perspectives on the World Court, the United States, and international dispute resolution in a
changing world. The lntematimwl Lawyer, 25 (3), 675-711. At 678.
9
Ibid, at p.679.
10
Cj. Written Statement of the United States of America, June 20, 1995: Part I: Introduction and Summary. The
Hague: Greffier, International Court of Justice. Loc. cit., Ch. III, at Note 20.
11
A taxonomy of which includes Japan, the nations of Western Europe and East Asia, as well as the United
States, its other Western allies and the remaining Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council.
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understanding that the nuclear weapon States will eventually disarm, but on their own terms,

and with no specific obligations touching on methods, time-scales or any other

consideration. 12
That discrimination, in the form of the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 13 took

the form of a bargain or contract (now tantamount to opinio juris) between the two sides
which was negotiated under conditions of duress. The overwhelming military strength of the
five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council served to ensure the
accession of most members of the international community to a treaty premised on a
fundamental inequity, and one which can have no rational defence in terms of "the general
principles of law recognised by civilised nations", 14 nor indeed international law generally.
The primary significance of the Opinion is that it has revealed, by its affirmation of
the application of peremptory norms of general international law to questions of the legality
of nuclear weapons (of which the principle norm i:-. jus cogens), 15 the insupportable status of
the NPT, a treaty which has manifestly failed in its principal aims of limiting, and then
eliminating, nuciear weapons.

By its implicit recognition that the fundamental humanitarian rules of the 1907
Hague Convention IV and Regulations, 16 and the 1949 Geneva Conventions 17 and 1977
Additional Protocols I and !I

18

bcnr attributes approaching jus cogens (in that they are

"intransgressible principles of customary international law")

12

19

the Court has effectively

Supra, at Note I, Article): I-VI, which was extended indefinitely at the NPT Review and Extension
Conference, New York, April, 1995.
1
~ 79 U.N.T.S. 161.
14
Refer to Appendix 2: The Statute of the International Cou~! of Justice, Article 36, para. 2 (a.) confers the
jurisdiction of the Court in matters concerning the interpretation of treaties, while Article 38, para. I (c.) allows
the Court to apply "the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations".
15
Boyle, F.A. (1986). The relevance of international law to the "paradox" of nuclear deterrence. 80 Nw. U.L.
Rev.6{1986).1407-1448,at 1447.
16
U.K.T.S. 6 (1971), Cmnd. 4575.
17
75 U.N.T.S. 3; U.K. T.S. 39 (1958), Cmnd. 550.
18
1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Misc. 19 (1977), Cmnd. 6927.
19
Refer to Chapter IV, Section 3.1.1. Opinion. pant 79. [35 l.L.M. 809 ( 1996)]. Boyle (Loc. cit., at Note 15, at
1445) has argued persuasively that any interna(ional agreement which purports to create a legal status
impermissible in intcrnationa! law (since it violates a peremptory norm of international law) is void in
accordance with Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Cm1vc11tion on tf1c Law of Treaties [1155 U.N.T.S. 331]. Article
53 states:
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rejected the lawfulness of the doctrine of deterrence, the cornerstone of arguments before it
contending the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
Arguably, its finding of non liquet on the question of legality in circumstances of
extreme self-defence20 has given some comfort to the declared nuclear weapon States, since
it echoes Article X of the NPT, which gives each State Party the sovereign right to
"withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject
1

matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country" .Z In other words,
the Court was not prepared to deny the supremacy of national interest over international law.
Nevertheless, such an outcome is still far removed from an affirmation of such supremacy.
The only possible justification for the continued existence of a regime of

non~

proliferation is as a transitional phase in the progress of disarmament. 22 Since the NPT has
failed as an instrument capable of supporting comprehensive disarmament initiatives, its
discretlit should form the starting point for moves to abandon it as a prerequisite for the
development of a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention constructed along the lines
of other Conventions banning weapons of mass destruction. 23
These alternative analyses of the significance of the Opinion lend credence, as
Andrew Mack asserts, 24 to its perception as a two~edged sword. This aspect of the decision is
most vulnerable to interpretation as the inevitable result of extra-judicial influence,

A trcnty is void if, nt the time of its conclusion, it connicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the internutionnl community of States
ns a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which cnn be modified only
by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
It is submitted that, even had the Court chosen not to characterise the fundillnental tenets of humanitarian law in
unncd connie! as amounting to jus coge11s (as it did at pam 79 of the Opinion), such rules would still now carry
that attribute as customary intcrnationul law. Thus, the NPT cannot escape nullity on the grounds of
retrospcctivity.
20
Loc. cir., supra, at Chapter IV, Section 3.1. Opinion, para. 105 (2) E.
21
U1c. cil., at Note 13. See also Appendix 3.
22
Canberra Commission on the Eliminntion of Nuclear weap0ns (1996). Report of the Canberra Commission
011 the Eliminatiml of Nuclear weapons. Canherru: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trude. At p.l:
"Statement".
23
The 1972 Convellfion on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons [ 1015 U.N. T.S. 163], ami the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convemion [32 l.LM.
800 (1993)1 provide models for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in terms of their scope, comprehensiveness und
verification apparatus. See Note 43, infra.
21
" Mack, A. (1996, July 10). Disarming logic a test for nuclear powers. The Australian, p.!3.
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especially from the United States. Nevertheless, the absence of strong evidence to that effect
must work in the Court's favour. 25

2.3. PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DEFENCE.

As the thesis has stressed, the nub

~f

the Opinion is its penultimate holding that the

Court could not conclude definitively, given the current state of international law and
elements of fact before it, whether a State could use nuclear weapons lawfully in defence of
.

.

Its very existence.

26

This outcome has called into question the relationship between the jus ad bellum
customary rules governing resort to war, now codified in the United Nations Charter, and the
humanitarian laws of armed conflict, the modern jus in bello. 27 Judge Wecramantry has
expressed in his Dissenting Opinion the current position of the law as it resolves the blurred
distinction which the Opinion makes between the two:
Whatever be the merits or otherwise of resorting to the use of force (the
province of the jus ad bellum), when once the domain of force is entered,
the governing law in that domain is the jus in bello. The humanitarian laws
of war take over and govern all who participate, assailant and victim alike.
The argument before the Court has proceeded as though, once the selfdefence exception to the use of force comes into operation, the applicability
of the jus in bello falls away. This supposition is juristically wrong and logi25

But note that there are unsubstantiated reports of extra-juridical iniluences on the Court. most substantially
(and unsurprisingly) from NGOs. Two examples:
In response to the insistent urgings of the nuclear weapon states (NWS), the Court could have
used it.~ discretionary power to refuse to consider the case altogether.
Weiss, P. ( 1996). Notes on a miswulersrood decision: The World Court's near perfect Adl'i.I'OJ)' Opinion in the
Nuclear weapon Case. Unpublished manuscript, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms,
New York. At p. I.
More prosaically:
Tile former President of the Court, Sir Robert Jennings, warned that budget cuts had forced
the Court typing pool to be closed. He appealed for everyone to usc their influence to protect
the Court "at this decisiPe moment for this precious creation" (original emphasis).
Pn~iect U.K. (no date), [Leaflet]. Hailsham. Still waiting for nuclear judgment day: The Court
under pressure. Author.
26
Ibid, Note 20.
27
Refer to Chapter IV, Section 3.1.1.

World Court
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-ca1ly untenable ....The contention that the legality of the use of force justifies
a breach of humanitarian law is ... a total non-sequitur. 28
This appears, with respect, unequivocally to state lex lata on the question of the
applicability of humanitarian law to armed conflict. There is no doubt that a State, when
attacked, may, in the first instance, lawfully defend itself with whatever methods are
consonant with the rules governing the use of force. It may use those which are necessary,
and in proportion to those used against it, and even in anticipation of an imminent attack
upon it.

29

However, it seems impossible to deny the irrelevance of any concept of
proportionality in the case of a usc of nuclear weapons in self-defence, which, in any event,
would almost certainly take the form of anticipatory self-defence using a first-strike launch
of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
Further, it has been suggested by Brownlie and Singh that Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, concerning measures for immediate self-defence, precludes any resort to
armed force which does not follow from a previous armed atlack? 0 This interpretation
subordinates the customary law of jus ad bellum to positive conventional law, and renders a
first-strike nuclear attack in anticipatory self-defence illegal.:n
The issues surrounding the principles of self-defence as they relate to the use of
nuclear weapons, of which the above discussion represents only a small part, are of
surpassing importance in the question put by the U.N. General Assembly: "Is the threat or

use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?" 32 That
alone required the International Court of Justice carefully to consider, interpret and apply

28

Dissenting Opinion of Jur.lgc Wccramantry, Part IV. 35 l.L.M. 809 (1996).
The dicta in the Caroline Case, Loc. cit., at Ch. III, Note 32.
JO Sec Appendix J. I. Brownlie, cited in Pogany, I. (1986). Nuclear weapons and self-defence in intcrnalionnl
law. 2 Com/. J.l. L. 97, at 108, 109. Singh, N., & Me Whinney, E. (1989). Nuclear weapons and contemporaJ)'
international law. (2nd rev. ed.). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. At p. ]66. It is emphasised here that this
discussion is not intended to allude to the relevance of reprisal to the case of a nuclear exchange, but takes the
general position that reprisal, as a principle of internntional law, is largely redundant in that context.
31
It must be acknowledged that this argument hns its detractors, such as Bowell, who contends that all
customary rights not inconsistent with those held under the U.N. Charter remain unimpaired. Loc. cit., at Note
29

30.
n Opinion, para. I. Loc. cit., at Note 28.
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those principles to the wealth of evidence of fact before it, as it delivered its Judgment. Its
failure to do so is a matter for regret.

3. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, RIGHTS, AND LAW.

It will be recalled that the thesis has taken as fundamental certain principles
concerning the nature of international politics and the normative structure of the international
system; the so-called ''neo-liberal'' approach. 33 These were summarised as:
(a.). Co-operation and complex interdependence between States m all spheres of
activity.

(b.). Universal adherence to principles and norms of international behaviour by
States.

(c.). The essential role of non-State actors in the international arena.

These are the attributes of a community of peers whose individual sovereign
members have relinquished their absolute sovereignty by the fact of their statehood, and the
rights and obligations they acknowledge as residing in that status.J 4
The United Nations era has seen a rapid growth in the rate of development of the
system of relations between States. The fifty States of 1945 have today become almost two
hundred, while conventional international law has multiplied exponentially. The result has
been that the importance, as well as the quantum, of rights and duties which States mutually
acknowledge, and which they seek to exercise, has also expanded rapidly. As a consequence,

33

See Chapter II, Section I: Introduction.
Franck, cited in Peck, C. (1996). The United Nations as a dispute .\'C/1/ement system: improved mechanisms
for the prevention and resolution of conflict. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. At pp.\64-166. As Franck
notes:
Onl:: a few decades ago, international law applied exclusively to States. Today, it is an
intricate network of laws governing myriad rights and dutie5 that stretch across and
beyond m1tional boundaries, piercing the statist veil even while sometimes pretending
thnt nothing has changed. (p.24).
34
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the successes and failures of the International Court of Justice as an effective World Court
have been thrown into sharp relief.
The cenlral difficulty for the Court is that States are, on the whole, reluctant to
concede any decision-making control to an external agent, and especially a non-State entity
such as the Court. One telling statistic is that, by August 1995, only 61 States, less than onethird of the Member States of the United Nations, had agreed to compulsory jurisdiction
under the Optional Clause arrangements of Article 36 (2) of the Court's Statute. Of the five
Permanent Members of the Security Council, only the United Kingdom currently endorses
them. 35

This reality is ameliorated somewhat by the appearance in the present Opinion of the
United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France, but remains of serious
concern.
The most pressing problem for the international community, in this context, is the
need to seek ways in which the most important judicial component of the United Nations
Organisation can be incorporated more closely into lhc global system of dispute resolution.
Ve1y few States are willing to risk the adverse consequences of denying the validity of rules
of recognition in international law, such as the binding nature of treaty obligations and the
practices of States.

36

For the rest, such rules are known to obligate States, and to fonn the

foundation on which rights subsist in international law. The International Court of Justice
must be the forum of last resort for the resolution of disputes, and for advisory opinions,
involving the substantive components of those rights.
The solution of this highly complex problem will involve issues of confidencebuilding among States, of the Court's relevance to international relations and law in the
corning century, of its flexibility in accommodating rapid change, and of its efficiency and
effectiveness in discharging its duties.
Most fundamentally, it must be allowed to address solutions to disputes, and render
Advisory Opinions, in ways which incorporate an overtly political component. As Gordon

JS Ibid., at Note 34. p.J70.
36
Although the so-called "outlaw" or "pariah" States, such as North Korea, Libya, Iraq and Iran have been
accused by Western nations of having done so, routinely, over many years.
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has observed,

37

the Court is, and has always been, much more than simply a com1 of law

(which, given the nature of international law, it could never be).

Any perusal of a list of cases decided before the present Court, and its predecessor, 38
will show that, with few exceptions, those cases incorporated issues carrying political or

diplomatic dimensions. 39 The present Opinion is no exception to that truism. Should the
Court begin to leaven its work in the legal domain with a greater measure of pragmatic
political reality, it will enhance its ability to assist the development of international law
which better serves the needs of its subjects. In the final analysis, the public Law of Nations
is, like politics, the art of the possible.

4. A FINAL APPRAISAL.

The Advisory Opinion called by resolution of the United Nations General Assembl/0

resulted in the most extensive proceedings in the history of the Court. The significance of the

question, and its subject, served to ensure intense global interest, and wide participation by

the community of nations.
The substantive content of the Opinion has created as many legal and political

questions as it has answered. As Judge Shahabuddeen commented, any legal right of a State
"to put the planet to death" is surely the most literal and indefensible application of the

maximjiatjustitia ruat coe/um.

41

What, in fact, impelled the Court to its finding of non liquet? Surely it is a primary
characteristic of all courts that the law is known to them. 42 Again, on what basis has the
37

Ibid., Note 6.
Permanent Court of International Justice ( 1922-1940),
39
Eyffinger, A. (1996). 11w lntemational CDurt of Justice 1946-1996. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
pp. 374-385.
40
Sec Foreword .
41
"Let justice be done, though the heavens fall". Dissenting Opinion, Loc. cit., Ch. IV, at Note 19. Judge
Shahabuddeen also noted here bis predecessor, Judge Carneiro's, view in the Minquiers and Ecrelws Case.
(France v. United Kingdom) [I.C.J. Reports !953 p.l09] that " .... no judge nowadays can blindly follow the
obsolete rulejiatj11stitia, pereat mwtdus", In Shahabuddccn's view, that rule should, undoubtedly, now be ''fiat
justitia, ne pereat mundus" - "Let justice be done, and the world ttot be endangered".
42
As embodied in the maxim jura novit curia. One of the Court's most strident critics has stated " .... the Court's
often Delphic pronouncements warrant the concern of anyone interested in enhancing the inter;rity of
~8

TilC

76
Court sought to subordinate the settled humanitarian rules of armed conflict to a nascent

principle of "State Survival", and what are the components of that principle? These and

many other uncertainties infuse and surround the Opinion.

To conclude: the Court had three alternative legal paths on which to travel:
(a.). It could find that, given the evidence of facts before it, and the current state of
international law, it was not able to express an opinion on the legality or illegality of nuclear
weapons when used in exceptional or extreme circumstances.

(b.). It could find that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was unlawful in all
circumstance, without exception, on the basis of the universal nature of humanitarian law.

(c.). It could find that there are circumstances, however limited, in which the threat or
use of nuclear weapons is lawful.

Its ambiguous embrace of the first alternative continues the legal uncertainty
surrounding this greatest of questions. Only a specific convention requiring complete nuclear
disarmament will remove it. 43
The legal status of the threat or usc of nuclear weapons ought, in fact, to be
abundantly clear. Nuclear weapons are irretrievably illegal, in all circumstances, in terms of
international humanitarian law, and their use would constitute a crime against humanity. As
this thesis has demonstrated, no alternative exists in fact, or in law. 44

international legal communication." Nafziger, J. (1984). The development of international law: obstacles and
hopes. Australian Owlook, 38. (1), 33-39, at 36. This overstates the case. The arcane and labyrinthine internal
decision-making processes of the Court, dl:Scribed by Singh, must be a major factor contribming to judgments
which lack a measure of coherence and lucic.'ity. Singh, N. (1989). The role and record of the lllfernarional
Court of ltl.l"fice. Dordrecht: Marti nus Nijhoff. At pp. 382-399.
4
J The Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy has drafted u "Model Nuclear Weapons Convention", on the
basis of a "comprehensive approach" to nuclear disannament, and within a "timebound framework", as called
for in Resolution 50/70P of the 50th General Assembly of the United Nations. Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear
Policy (1996). Model nuclear weapons convemion. Unpublished manuscript, L.C.N.P., New York.
44
The most comprehensive treatise on the question of the lawfulness of nuclear weapons (from a perspective of
comprehensive illegality) is undoubtable Singh, N. & McWhinney, E. (1989). Nuclear weapons and
contemporary international law (2nd rev. cd.) Dordrccht: Martinus Nijhoff.
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Charter of the United Nations

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which
justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law ca.n be
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, AND FOR
THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours,
and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance
of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest, and to employ intemational machinery for the promotion of the economic and social

advancement of all peoples, HAVE RESOLED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH
THESE AIMS Accordingly, our respective Governments, through rep1~sentatives assembled in the city
of San Francisco, who have exhibit·;d their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed
to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be
known as the United Nations.

CHAPTER I
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
l. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in
accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to a of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership,

23

10121197 13:01:08

Jn Project :United Nations Chaner (text)

http://www.ya1e.edu/lawweb/ava1on/un/unchart.htm

shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and. justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with
the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United
Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in
accordance with these Principles so far as may be n~cessary for the maintenance of international peace
and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II
MEMBERSHIP
Article 3
The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the
United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously
signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in
accordance with Article ll 0.

Article 4
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to a other peace-loving states which accept the
obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and
willing to carry out these obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the Nations will be effected by a decision of the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security CGuncil.

Article 5
A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the
Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and
privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6
A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present
Charter may be' expelled from the Organization by the General Assem, .; upon the recommendation of
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the Security Council.

CHAPTER III
ORGANS
Article 7
l. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security
Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council. an International Court of Justice, and
a Secretariat.

2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present
Charter.

Article 8
The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any
capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.

CHAPTER IV
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Composition
Article 9
1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.
2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

Functions and Powers
Article 10
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present
Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and,
except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or
to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11
1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of
international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of
armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the
Security Council or to both.
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of inter~ national
peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council,
or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2,
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and. except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to
the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is
necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after

di3cussion.
3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to siluations which are likely to
endanger international peace and security.
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Arlicle shall not limit the general scope of
Article 10.

Article 12
1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned
to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to
that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly
at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are
being dealt with by the Security Council and similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of
the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases
to deal with such matters.

Article 13
1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:
a. promoting interntltional co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive
development of international law and its codification;
b. promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health
fields, an assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
2. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the Geneml with respect to matters mentioned
in paragraph ) above are set forth in Chapters TX and X.

Article 14
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the
peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general
welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the
provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Article 15
1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security
Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided
upon or taken to main-tain international peace and security.
2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United
Nations.

Article 16
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The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international trusteeship system
as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the ap:Jfoval of the trusteeship agreements
for areas not designated as strategic.

Article 17
1. The Genera Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of tile Organization.
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General
Assembly.
3. The Assembly shall consider and approve any finam::ial and budgetary arrangements with specialize
agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the adntinistrative budgets of such specialized
agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.

Voting
Article 18
1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two~ thirds majority
of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the
maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non~permanent members of the
Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of
members of the Trusteeship Council in accordunce with paragraph l of Article 86, the admission of
new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the
expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary
questions.
3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be
decided by a two~thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Article 19
A Member of the United Nations which is ln arrears in the payment of its fmancial contributions to the
Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds
the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly
may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to
conditions beyond the of the Member.

Procedure
Article 20
The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion
may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security
Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Naticns.

Article 21
The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for each
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session.

Article 22
The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance
of its functions.

CHAPTERV
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Composition
Article 23
l. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of
China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist , the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The
General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members
of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first in- stance to the contribution of
Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of inter- national peace and security and to the
other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.
2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the
first election of the non- permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security
Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one
year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.
3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers
Article 24
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and
agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall acl in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge
of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, Vlfl, and XII.
3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General
Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council
in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 26
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In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the
least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall
be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in
Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United-Nations for the establishment cf a
system for the regulation of armaments.

Voting
Article 27
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine
member...
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under
Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Procedure
Article 28
1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of
the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at times at the seat of the Organization.
2. The Security Council shall hold meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be
represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.
3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in
its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29
The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance
of its functions.

Article 30
The Securily Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its
President.

Article 31
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the. Security Council may participate,
without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter
considers that the interests of that Member arc specially affected.

Article 32
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which
is not a Member of the United Nations, if il is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security
Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The
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Security Council shall any down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which
is not a Member of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VI
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the conr.inuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security, shall, first of a, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies ur arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by
such means.

Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international
friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or
situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35
I. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to
in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security
Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the
purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this
Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles ll and j_2.

Article 36
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a
situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute
which have already been adopted by the: parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into
consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International
Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means
indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
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2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36
or to recommend such terms of settlement a... it may consider appropriate.

Article 38
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if ali the parties to
any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the
dispute.

CHAPTER VII
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF
THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles:!: and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Counctl may, before making the
recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties
concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such
provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties
concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional
measures.

Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to
apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations.

Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the mllintenance of international peace
and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its and in accordance with a
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, a...;;sistance, and facilities, including rights of passage,
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
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2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of
readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security
Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security
Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44
When Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented
on it to provide armed forces in fultilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that
Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning
the employment of contingents of lhat Member's armed forces.

Article 45
In order to enable the Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately
available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength
and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined,
within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the
Security Council with the assistance of the Military Committee.

Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of
the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on
questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international
peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its dispo~al, the regulation of
armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the
Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently
represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the
efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities re- quires lhe participation of that Member its
work.
3. The Military Staff Committee be responsible under the Security Council for the strategit Jirection of
any anned forces paced at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of
such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the security Council and after consultation
with appropriate regional agencies, may establish sub-commit- tees.

Article 48
1. The a~tion required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of
them, as the Security Council may determine.
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2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their
action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the
measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other
state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special
economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the
Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore. international peace
and security.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Article 52
1. Nothing in the present Charter the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate fur
regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities arc consistent with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies
shall make every effort to achieve pacific seltlement of local disputes through such regional
arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes
through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states
concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53
l. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for
enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the
exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for
pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on
the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments

f23

10/21/9713:01:10

011 t'rOJCCt: Umted Nations Charter (text)

concerned, be charged with the responsibility fa~· ,

bttp:l/www.yale.edullawweb/avalol!/un/uncbart.htm

>'enting further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in para- graph I of this Article applies to any state which during the
Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54
The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in
contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of
international peace and security.

CHAPTER IX
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CO-OPERATION
Article 55
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful
and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standa:;ds of living, fu employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and
development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural
and educational co- operation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 57
I. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide
international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural,
educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in
accordance with the provisions of Article 63.
2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as
specialized agencies.

Article 58
The Organization shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of
the specialized agencies.

Article 59
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The Organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the
creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in
Article 55.

Article 60
Responsibility for the disl!harge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be
vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and
Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.

CHAPTER X
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
Composition
Article 61
1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United Nations elected
by the General Assembly.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council
shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate
re-election.
3. At the first election after the increase in the membership of the Economic and Social Council from
twenty-seven to fifty-four members, in addition to the members elected in place of the nine members
whose term of office expires at the end of that year, twenty-seven additional members shall be elected.
Of these twenty-seven additional members, the term of office of nine members so elected shall expire
at the end of one year, and of nine other members at the end of two years, in accordance with
arrangements made by the General Assembly.
4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers
Article 62
1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to
international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make
recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the
United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.
2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all.
3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters
falling within its competence.
4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences
on matters falling within its competence.

23

10/21/9713:01:11

1Project

: United Nations Charter (text)

http://www.yale.cdu/Jawweblavalon/unluochart.htm

Article 63
l. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agteements with any of the agencies re.terred to in
Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with
the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.
2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and
recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the
Members of the United Nations.

Article 64
1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular re- ports from the
specialized agencies. may make arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with the
specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations and
to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly.
2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.

Article 65
The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall a'isist the
Security Council upon its request.

Article 66
1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in
connexion with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.
2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of
the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.
3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be
assigned to it by the General Assembly.

Voting
Article 67
I. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present
and voting.

Procedure
Article 68
The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the
promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may for the performance of its functions.

Article 69

10121/9713:01:11

'"Project : United Nations Chaner (text)

http://www.yale.edullawweblavalonlunlunchart.htm

The Economic and Social Council sha11 invite any Member of the United Nations to participate,
without vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that Member.

Article 70
The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for representatives of the specialized
agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established
by it, and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations of the specialized agencies.

Article 71
The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for con:;ultation with
non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such
arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national
organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.

Article 72
I. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of
selecting its President.
2. The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall
include provision for the convening of meetings on tile request of a majority of its members.

CHAPTER XI
DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES
Article 73
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of
territories whose r..eoples have not yet attained a full measur·: of self-government recognize the
principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred
trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security
established by the present Charter, the well- being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this
end:
a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social,
and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to
assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the
particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
c. to further international peace and security;
d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one
another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the
practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as
security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical
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nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are
respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and Xlli apply.

Article 74
Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this
Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general
principle of good-neigh-bourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest
of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

CHAPTER XII
INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM
Article 75
The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the
administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent
individual agreements. These territories arc hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

Article 76
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations
laid down in Article I of the present Charter, shall be:
a. to further international peace and security;
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the
trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may
be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed
wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement~
c. to encourage respect for human rights ami for fundamental freedoms for all with- out : as to race,
sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the
world; and
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United
Nations and their, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without
prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

Article 77
1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed
thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:
a. territories now held under mandate;
b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.
2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will
be brought under the trustee~ ship system and upon what terms.
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Article 78
The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories IVhich have become Members of the United
Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

Article 79
The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any
alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the
mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and
shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

Article 80
I. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and
.8..1. placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded,
nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of
any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the
United Nations may respectively be parties.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of
the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the
trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

Article 81
The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be
administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory.
Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the
Organization itself.

Article 82
There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a Mrategic area or areas which may include part
or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement
or agreements made under Article 43.

Article 83
I. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of
the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security
Council.
2. he basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.
3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without
prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perfonn
those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic,
social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84
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It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in
the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make
use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations
towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for
local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85
1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not
designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their
alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the
General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

CHAPTER XIII
THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL
Composition
Article 86
l. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:
a. those Members administering trust territories;
b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories;
and
c. as many other Members elected for three~ year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary
to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those
Members of the United Nations which ad~ minister trust territories and those which do not.
2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent
it therein.

Fnnctions and Powers
Article 87
The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their
functions, may;
a. consider reports submitted by the ad- ministering authority;
b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;
c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the
administering authority; and
d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.
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Article 88
The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and
educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for
each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the
General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

Voting
Article 89
l. Each member of the Tmsteeship Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and
voting.
Procedure

Article 90
1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its
President.
2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its mles, which shall include
provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

Article 91
The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and
Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively
concerned.

CHAPTER XIV
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Article 92
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall
function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

Article 93
1. All Members of the United Nations are facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.
2. A state which is not of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice on to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation
of the Security Council.
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Article 94
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International
Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered
by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may if it deems
necessary make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give to the judgment.
I

I

Article 95
Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the
solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which
may be concluded in the future.

Article 96
I. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give
an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so
authori?ed by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal
questions arising within the scope of their activities.

CHAPTER XV
THE SECRETARIAT
Article 97
The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary- General and such staff as the Organization may require.
The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the
Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the
Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall
perfonn such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make
an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his
opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100
I. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive
instructions from any government or from any other authority externa to the Organization. They shall
refrain from any action which might on their position as international officials responsible only to the
Organization.
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2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively inter- national character of
the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the
discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101
1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General
Assembly.
2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the
Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a
part of the Secretariat.
3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the
conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence,
and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a
geographical basis as possible.

CHAPTER XVI
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Article 102
1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations
after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat
and published by it.
2. No party to any such treaty or iiHernalional agreement which has not been registered in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph I of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ
of the United Nations.

Article 103
In the event of a conflict between the obligatiom of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under
the present Charter shall prevail.

Article 104
The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.

Article 105
I. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities
as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall
similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their
functions in connexion with the Organization.
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3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the
application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the
United Nations for this purpose.

CHAPTER XVII
TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
Article 106
Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of
the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties
to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion
requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the
Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Article 107
Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during
the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized
as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

CHAPTER XVIII
AMENDMENTS
Article 108
Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when
they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United
Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Article 109
1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the
present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the
General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. Each Member of the
United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.
2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take
effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the
Members of the United Nations including the permanent members of the Security Council.
3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly
following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be
placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so
decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven
members of the Security Council.
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CHAPTER XIX
RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE
Article 110
l. The present Charter shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes.
2. The shall be deposited with the Government of the Unite States of America, which shall notify a the
signatory states of each deposit as well as the Secrctary~General of the Organization when he has been
appointed.
3. The present Charter shall come into force upon the deposit of by the Republic of China, France, the
Union of Soviet Socialist, the United King- dam of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America, and by a majority of the other signatory states. A protocol of the deposited shall
thereupon be drawn up by the Government of the United States of America which shall communicate
copies thereof to all the signa- tory states.
4. The states signatory to the present Chartar which ratify it after it has come into force will become
original Members of the United Nations on the date of the deposit of their respective ratifications.

Article 111
The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English, and Spanish texts are equally
authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of ~the United States of America.
Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other
signatory states.
IN FAITH WHEREOF the representatives of the Governments of the United Nations have signed the
present Charter.
DONE at the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and
forty-five.

An Electronic Publication of the Avalon Project- William C. Fray and Lisa A. Spar,
Co-Directors
Copyright 1996 The Avalon Project
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Statute of the International Court of Justice
Article 1
The International Court of Justice established by the Charter of the United Nations as the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations shall be constituted and shall function in accordance with the
provisions of the present Statute.
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Statute of the International Court of Justice

CHAPTER I
ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT
Article 2
The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality
from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their
respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized
competence in international law.

Article 3
I. The Court shall consist of fifteen members, no two of whom may be nationals of the same state.
2. A person who for the purposes of membership in the Court could be regarded as a national of more
than one state shall be deemed to be a national of the one in which he ordinarily exercises civil and
political rights.

Article 4
1. The members of the Court shall be elected by the General Assembly and by the Security Council
from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Pennanent Court of Arbitration, in
accordance with the following provisions.
2. In the case of Members of the United Nations not represented in the Permanent C0urt of Arbitration,
candidates shall be nominated by national groups appointed for this purpose by theii governments
under the same conditions as those prescribed for members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration by
Article 44 of the Convention of The Hague of 1907 for the pacific settlement of intemational disputes.

3. The conditions under which a state which is a party to the present Statute but is not a Member of the
United Nations may participate in electing the members of the Court shall, in the absence of a special
agreement, be laid down by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 5
1. At least three months before the date of the election, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall address a written request to the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration belonging to the
states which are parties to the present Statute, and to the members of the national groups appointed
under Article 4, paragraph 2, inviting them to undertake, within a given time, by national groups, the
nomination of persons in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court.
2. No group may nominate more than four persons, not more than two of whom shall be of their own
nationality. In no case may the number of candidates nominated by a group be more than double the
number of seats to be filled.

Article 6
Before making these nominations, each national group is recommended to consult its highest court of
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justice, its legal faculties and schools of law, and its national academies and national sections of
international academies devoted to the study of law.

Article 7
I. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of a!l the persons thus nominated.
Save as provided in Article 12, paragraph 2, these shall be the only persons eligible.
2. The Secretary-General shall su\.J~it this list to the General Assembly and to the Security Council.

Article 8
The General Assembly and the Security Council shall proceed independently of one another to elect
the members of the Court.

Article 9
At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should
individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the representation
of the main fonns of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured.

Article 10
1. Those candidates who obtain an absolute majority of votes in the General Assembly and in the
Security Council shall be considered as elected.
2. Any vote of the Security Council, whether for the election of r'uges or for the appointment of
members of the conference envisaged in A11icle 12, shall be taken without any distinction between
pennanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council.
3. In the event of more than one national of the same state obtaining an absolute majority of the votes
both of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, the eldest of these only shall be considered
as elected.

Article 11
If, after the first meeting held for the purpose of the election, one or more seats remain to be filled, a
second and, if necessary, a third meeting shall take place.

Article 12
I. If, after the third meeting, one or more seats still remain unfilled, a joint conference consisting of si::.
members, three appointed by the General Assembly and three by the Security Council, may be formed
at any time at the request of either the General Assembly or the Security Council, for the purpose of
choosing by the vote of an absolute majority one name for each seat still vacant, to submit to the
General Assembly and the Security Council for their respective acceptance.
2. If the joint conference is unanimously agreed upon any person who fulfills the required conditions,
he may be included in its list, even though he was not included in the list of nominations referred to in
Article 7.
3. If the joint conference is satisfied that it will not be successful in procuring an election, those
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members of the Court who have already been elected shall, within a period to be fixed by the Security
Council, proceed to fill the vacant seats by selection from among those candidates who have obtained
votes either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council.
4. In the event of an equality of votes among the judges, the eldest judge shall have a casting vote.

Article 13
1. The members of the Court shall be elected for nine years and may be re-elected; provided, however,
that of the judges elected at the first election, the terms of five judecs shall expire at the end of three
years and the terms of five more judges shall expire at the end of six years.
2. The judges whose terms are to expire at the end of the above-mentioned initial periods of three and
six years shall be chosen by lot to be drawn by the Secretary-General immediately after the first
election has been completed.
3. The members of the Court shall continue to discharge their duties until their places have been filJed.
Though replaced, they shall finish any cases which they may have begun.
4. In the case of the resignation of a member of the Court, the resignation shall be addressed to the
President of the Court for transmission to the Secretary-General. This last notification makes the place
vacant.

Article 14
Vacancies shall be filled by the same method as that laid down for the first election subject to the
following provision: the Secretary-General shall, within one month of the occurrence of the vacancy,
proceed to issue the invitations provided for in Article 5, and the date of the electior, shall be fixed by
the Security Council.

Article 15
A member of the Court elected to replace a member whose term of office has not expired shall hold
office for the remainder of his predecessor's tenn.

Article 16
I. No member of the Comt may exercise any political or administrative function, or engage in any
other occupation of a professional nature.
2. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

Article 17
l. No member of the Court may act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case.
2. No member may participate in the decision of any case in which he has previously taken part as
agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, or as a member of a national or international court, or
of a commission of enquiry, or in any other capacity.

3. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
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Article 18
1. No member of the Court can be dismissed unless, in the unanimous opinion of the other members,
he has ceased to fulfill the required conditions.
2. Formal notification thereof shall be made to the Secretary-General by the Registrar.
3. This notification makes the place vacant.

Article 19
The members of the Court, when engaged on the business of the Court, shall enjoy diplomatic
privileges and immunities.

Article 20
Every member of the Court shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court
that he will exercise his powers impartially and conscientiously.

Article 21
1. The Court shall elect its President and Vice-President for three years; they may be re-elected.
2. The Court shall appoint its Registrar and may provide for the appointment of such other officers as
may be necessary.

Article 22
I. The seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague. This, however, shall not prevent the Court
from sitting and exercising its functions elsewhere whenever the Court considers it desirable.
2. The President and the Registrar shall reside at the seat of the Court.

Article 23
1. The Court shall remain permanently in session, except during the judicial vacations, the dates and
duration of which shall be fixed by the Court.
2. Members of the Court ar~ entitled to periodic leave, the dates and duration of which shall be fixed
by the Court, having in mind the distance between The Hague and the home of each judge.
3. Members of the Court shall be bound, unless they are on leave or prevented from attending by
illness or other serious reasons duly explained to the President, to hold themselves pennanently at the
disposal of the Court.

Article 24
I. If, for some special reason, a member of the Court considers that he should not take part in the
decision of a particular case, he shall so inform the President.
2. If the President considers that for some special reason one of the members of the Court should not
sit in a particular case, he shall give him notice accordingly.
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3. If in any such case the member Court and the President disagree, the matter shall be settled by the
decision of the Court.

Article 25
1. The full Court shall sit except when it is expressly provided otherwise in the present Statute.
2. Subject to the condition that the number of judges available to constitute the Court is not thereby
reduced below eleven, the Rules of the Court may provide for allowing one or more judges, according
to circumstances and in rotation, to be dispensed from sitting.
3. A quorum of nine judges shall suffice to constitute the Court.

Article 26
I. The Court may from time to time form one or more chambers, composed of three or more judges as
the Court may determine, for dealing with particular categories of cases; for example, labour cases and
cases relating to transit and communications.

2. The Court may at any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The number of judges
to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the approval of the parties.
3. Cases shall be heard and determined by the chambers provided for in this article if the parties so
request.

Article 27
A judgment given by any of the chambers provided for in Articles 26 and 29 simi I be considered as
rendered by the Court.

Article 28
The chambers provided for in Articles 26 and 29 may, with the consent of the parties, sit and exercise
their functions elsewhere than at The Hague.

Article 29
With a view to the speedy dispatch of business, the Court shall fom1 annually a chamber composed of
five judges which, at the request of the parties, may hear and determine cases by summary procedure.
In addition, two judges shall be selected for the purpose of replacing judges who find it impossible to
sit.

Article 30
l. The Court shall frame rules for carrying out its functions. In particular, it shall lay down rules of
procedure.
2. The Rules of the Court may provide for assessors to sit with the Court or with any of its chambers,
without the right to vote.

Article 31
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I. Judges of the nationality of each of the parties shall retain their right to sit in the case before the
Court.
2. If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party
may choose a person to sit as judge. Such person shall be chosen preferably from among those persons
who have been nominated as candidates as provided in Articles 4 and 5.
3. If the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of these parties
may proceed to choose a judge as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. The provisions of this Article shall apply to the case of Articles 26 and 29. In such cases, the
President shall request one or, if necessary, two of the meP.<ters of the Court forming the chamber to
give place to the members of the Court of the nationality of the parties concerned, and, failing such, or
if they are unable to be present, to the judges specially chosen by the parties.
5. Should there be several parties in the same interest, they shall, for the purpose of the preceding
provisions, be reckoned as one party only. Any doubt upon this point shall be seltled by the decision of
the Court.
6. Judges chosen as laid down in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of this Article shall fulfil the conditions
required by Articles 2, 17 (paragraph 2), 20, and 24 of the present Statute. They shall take part in the
decision on terms of complete equality with their colleagues.

Article 32
I. Each member of the Court shall receive an annual salary.
2. The President shall receive a special annual allowance.
3. The Vice-President shall receive a special allowance for every day on which he acts as President.
4. The judges chosen under Article 31, other than members of the Court, shall receive compensation
for each day on which they exercise their functions.
5. These salaries, allowances, and compensation shall be fixed by the General Assembly. They may not
be decreased during the term of office.
6. The salary of the Registrar shall be fixed by the General Assembly on the proposal of the Court.
7. Regulations made by the General Assembly ~hall ftx the conditions under which retirement pensions
may be given to members of the Court and to the Registrar, and the conditions under which members
of the Court and the Registrar shall have their travelling expenses refunded.
8. The above salaries, allowances, and compensation shall be free of all taxation.

Article 33
The expenses of the Court shall be borne by the United Nations in such a manner as shall be decided
by the General Assembly.
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CHAPTER II
COMPETENCE OF THE COURT
Article 34
I. Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.
2. The Court, subject to and in conformity with its Rules, may request of public international
organizations information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information presented by
such organizations on their own initiative.
3. Whenever the construction of the constituent instrument of a public international organization or of
an international convention adopted thereunder is in question in a case before the Court, the Registrar
shall so notify the public international organization concemed and shall communicate to it copies of all
the written proceedings.

Article 35
I. The' Court shall be open to the states parties to the present Statute.
2. The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other states shall, subject to the special
provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Security Council, but in no case shall such
conditions place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court.
3. When a state which is not a Member of the United Nations is a party to a case, the Court shall fix the
amount which that party is to contribute towards the expenses of the Court. This provision shall not
apply if such state is bearing a share of the expenses of the Court.

Article 36
l. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation,
the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on
the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.
4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretaty-General of the United Nations, who shall
transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.
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5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice
and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be
acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which
they still have to run and in accordru ; with their terms.
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the
decision of the Court.

Article 37
Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been
instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter shall,
as between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice.

Article 38
I. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are

submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by
the contesting states:
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the b~neral principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59,judicia1 decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the
parties agree thereto.
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CHAPTER III
PROCEDURE
Article 39
I. The official languages of the Court shall be French and English. If the parties agree that the case
shall be conducted in French, the judgment shall be delivered in French. If the parties agree that the
case shall be conducted in English, the judgment shall be delivered in English.
2. In the absence of an agreement as to which language shall be employed, each party may, in the
pleadings, use the language which it prefers~ the decision of the Court shall be given in French and
English. In this case the Court shall at the same time determine which of the two texts shall be
considered as authoritative.

3. The Court shall, at the request of any party, authorize a language other than French or English to be
used by that party.

Article 40
I. Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of the special
agreement or by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the subject of the
dispute and the parties shall be indicated.
2. The Registrar shall forthwith communicate the application to all concerned.

3. He shall also notify the Members of the United Nations through the Secretary-General, and also any
other states entitled to appear before the Court.

Article 41
I. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties
and to the Security Council

Article 42
I. The parties shall be represented by agents.
2. They may have the assistance of counsel or advocates before the Court.
3. The agents, counsel, and advocates of parties before the Court shall enjoy the privileges and
immunities necessary to the independent exercise of their duties.

Article 43
1. The procedure shall consist of two parts: written and oral.
4
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2. The written proceedings shall consist of the communication to the Court and to the parties of
memorials, counter-memorials and, if necessary, replies; also all papers and documents in support.

3. These communications shall be made through the Registrar, in the order and within the time fixed by
the Court.
4. A certified copy of every document produced by one party shall be communicated to the other party.
5. The oral proceedings shall consist of the hearing by the Court of witnesses, experts, agents, counsel,
and advocates.

Article 44
1. For the service of all notices upon persons other than the agents, counsel, and advocates, the Court
shall apply direct to the government of the state upon whose territory the notice has to be served.
2. The same provision shall apply whenever steps are to be taken to procure evidence on the spot.

Article 45
The hearing shall be under the control of the President or, if he is unable to preside, of the
Vice-President; if neither is able to preside, the senior judge present shall preside.

Article 46
The hearing in Court shall be public, unless the Court shall decide otherwise, or unless the parties
demand that the public be not admitted .

Article 47
1. Minutes shall be made at each hearing and signed by the Registrar and the President.
2. These minutes alone shall be authentic.

Article 48
The Court shall make orders for the conduct of the case, shall decide the form and time in which each
party must conclude its arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence.

Article 49
The Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the agents to produce any document or to
supply any explanations. Formal note shall be taken of any refusal.

Article 50
The Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organization
that it may select, with the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an cxnert opinion.

Article 51

1012II97 13:27:05

,Cf\ Vr tnc UI'UlCU

nttp'J/www .un.orgtoverview!Statutclchapter3.html

1~1\llUNO::.

During the hearing any relevant questions are to be put to the witnesses and experts under the
conditions laid down by the Court in the rules of procedure referred to in Article 30.

Article 52
After the Court has received the proofs and evidence within the time specified for the purpose, it may
refuse to accept any further oral or written evidence that one party may desire to present unless the
other side consents.

Article 53
1. Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the other
party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim.
2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with
Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.

Article 54
I. When, subject to the control of the Court, the agents, counsel, and advocates have completed their
presentation of the case, the President shall declare the hearing closed.
2. The Court shall withdraw to consider the judgment.
3. The deliberations of the Court shall take place in private and remain secret.

Article 55
1. All questions shall be decided by a majority of the judges present.
2. In the event of an equality of votes, the President or the judge who acts in his place shall have a
casting vote.

Article 56
1. The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based.
2. It shall contain the names of the judges who have taken part in the decision.

Article 57
If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge
shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.

Article 58
The judgment shall be signed by the President and by the Registrar. It shall be read in open court, due
notice having been given to the agents.

Article 59
The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that

10121/97 13:27:05

.RTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

http://www.un.org/Overview/Statute/chapter3.html

particular case.

Article 60
The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the
judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party.

Article 61
1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of
some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given,
unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was
not due to negligence.
2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court expressly recording the
existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a character as to lay the case open to revision,
and declaring the application admissible on this ground.
3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment before it admits
proceedings in revision.
4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the discovery of the new
fact.
5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the date of the judgment.

Article 62
I. Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision
in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene.
2 It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request.

Article 63
1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which states other than those concerned in the case are
parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such states forthwith.
2. Every state so notified has the righl to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this right, the
construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it.

Arlicle 64
Unless otherwise decided by the Court, each party shall bear its own costs.
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CHAPTER IV
ADVISORY OPINIONS
Article 65
I. The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may
be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a fequest.
2. Questions upon which the advisory opinion of the Court is asked shall be laid before the Court by
means of a written request containing an exact statement of the question upon which an opinion is
required, and accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon the question.

Article 66
1. The Registrar shall forthwith give notice of the request for an advisory opinion to all states entitled
to appear before the Court.
2. The Registmr shall also, by means of a special and direct communication, notify any state (~ntitled to
appear before the Court or international organization considered by the Court, or, should it not be
sitting, by the President, as likely to be able to furnish information on the question, that the Court will
be prepared to receive, within a time limit to be hxed by the President, written statements, or to hear, at
a public sitting to be held for the purpose, oral statements relating to the question.
3. Should any such state entitled to appear before the Court have failed to receive the special
communication referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, such state may express a desire to submit a
written statement or to be heard; and the Court will decide.
4. States and organizations having presented written or oral statements or both shall be permitted to
comment on the statements made by other states or organizations in the form, to the extent, and within
the time limits which the Court, or, should it not be sitting, the President, shall decide in each
particular case. Accordingly, the Registrar shall in due time communicate any such written statements
to states and organizations having submitted similar statements.

Article 67
The Court shall deliver its advisory opinions in open court, notice having been given to the
Secretary-General and to the representatives of Members of the United Nations, of other states and of
international organizations immediately concerned.

Article 68
In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the
present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be
applicable.
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CHAPTERV
AMENDMENT
Article 69
Amendments to the present Statute shall be effected by the same procedure as is provided by the
Charter of the United Nations for amendments to that Charter, subject however to any provisions
which the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council may adopt concerning the
participation of states which are parties to the present Statute but are not Members of the United
Nations.

Article 70
The Court shall have power to propose such amendments to the present Statute as it may deem
necessary, through written communications to the Secretary~Gcneral, for consideration in conformity
with the provisions of Article 69.

10121197 13:30:24

APPENDIX3

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION .OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1 JULY 1968
[79 U.N.T.S. 161)

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

I July !968. 79 U.N.T.S. 161.

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the 'Parties to the Treaty,'
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war
and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take
measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the
danger of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for
the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear
weapons,
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, devel( . 'llent and other efforts to further the
application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable
materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear
technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclearweapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for
peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclearweapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to
participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute
alone or in co-operation ;vith other States to, the further development of the applications of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear
disarmament,
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning
nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to
seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and
to continue negotiations to this end,
Desiring to further the casing of international tension and the strengthening of trust
between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the
liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of
nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any St<1te, or in any other manner inconsistent with the

Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international
peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's
human and economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage,
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive
devices.

ARTICLE II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.

ARTICLE III
I. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Patty to the Treaty undertakes to accept
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International
Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the
fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nudear explosive devices.
Procedure.s for the sufeguards required by this Article shall be followed by with respect to
source or special fissionable !llaterial whether it is being produced, processed or used in any
principle wJclear facility or is outside such facility. The safeguards required by this Article
shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities
within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control
anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the
processing, use or production of special fissionable materials, to any non-nuclear-weapon
State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject
to the safeguards required by this A1ticle.

3. The safeguards required by this Article sha!I be implemented in a manner designed
to comply with Article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or
technological development of the Parties or international cowoperation in the field of peaceful
nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for
the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance
with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble
of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclearwweapon States Party to the Treaty sha!I conclude agreements with the
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either
individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days
from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instrument of
ratification or accession after the I80-day period, negotiation of such agreement shall
commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not
later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of such negotiations.

ARTICLE IV
I. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all
the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this
Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate
in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do
so shall also cowoperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international
organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, especially in the territories of nonwnuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty, with
due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

ARTICLEV
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in
accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through
appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of
nuclear explosions will be made available to nonwnuclear weapon States Patty to the Treaty
on a non~discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices
used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non~
nuclearwweapon. States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a
special internatiom.l agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body
with adequate representation of nonwnuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject
shall as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclearwweapon States Party
to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.

ARTICLE VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in
order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII
I. Any party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments which shall
circulate it to all Parties to the treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more
of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference, to
which they shall invite a lithe Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all
the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all the nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of
the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall
enter force for each P,trty that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon
the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the
instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other
Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, arc members of the Board of
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force
for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the
Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty
with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty
are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty
may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect with the Depositary Governments, the
convening of further conferences wilh the same objective of reviewing the operation of the
Treaty.

ARTICLE IX
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign
the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may
accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall he subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of
ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated Depositary
Goven1ments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force afler its ratification by the States, the
Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States
signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes
of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent
to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their
instrument of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly infonn all signatory and acceding
States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or
accession, the date of entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests
for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article
l 02 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw
from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three
months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be
extended for an additional period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the
Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified

copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments
of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of
July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

